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Three Views of Equal Protection: 
A Backdrop to Bakket 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. * 
The facts of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' 
are common knowledge among lawyers and laymen alike. Briefly, 
the University of California a t  Davis Medical School operated 
two separate admissions programs: a preferential admissions pro- 
gram for members of certain minority groups, and a regular ad- 
missions program for all other applicants. Minority applicants 
competed only against each other for sixteen of the one hundred 
available places. As a result, the qualifications of certain minority 
admittees as measured by undergraduate grades and test scores 
were significantly inferior to those of nonminority admittees.* The 
University argued that the admissions program was necessary to 
achieve its goal of filling at  least sixteen of the one hundred seats 
of each class with minority students. Allan Bakke applied to 
Davis in 1973 and 1974, but was not accepted either year even 
though his test scores and grades were substantially superior to 
the averages of the minority admittees? He subsequently brought 
suit alleging that the University, 
by virtue of its maintenance and operation of the special admis- 
sion program, prevented him solely because of his race from 
competing for all of the available places a t  the medical school 
and thereby discriminated against him in violation of the Four- 
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Privi- 
leges and Immunities Clause of the California Constitution . . . 
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ; and . . . that 
because of this unlawful discrimination, [the University] de- 
nied him admission to the medical scho01.~ 
t Q 1979 by J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
* Assistant to the President, Ricks College, Rexburg, Idaho. B.A., 1975, Brigham 
Young Universtiy; J.D., 1978, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
2. Brief for Respondent at 13, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(19%). 
The University insisted that all the admittees-including minority applicants-were 
fully qualified to study medicine at Davis. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3. Brief for Respondent at 13. 
4. Id. at 15. 
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The California Supreme Court held that Bakke was entitled to 
admission to the Davis Medical School and that the preferential 
admissions program offended the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Con~titution.~ 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and re- 
versed in part. The major issue before the Court was whether a 
racial classification that is designed to aid minority applicants, 
but which incidentally disadvantages nonminority applicants on 
account of their race, violates the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. The Court's answer to that question was 
less than decisive. Like the nation, the Court found itself deeply 
divided on the question of the legality of preferential admissions 
programs. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun 
took the position that the preferential admissions program of the 
Davis Medical School was entirely ~onstitutional.~ On the ather 
hand, Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist and Chief Jus- 
tice Burger saw the University's program as a simple violation of 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and would therefore have 
affirmed the California court's decision on statutory  ground^.^ 
Justice Powell agreed in part with the Stevens-Burger-Stewart- 
Rehnquist position, and held that Bakke should have been admit- 
ted? On the other hand, he also agreed in part with the Brennan- 
White-Marshall-Blackmun position, and held that  race- 
conscious admissions programs are not categorically unconstitu- 
tional? Justice Powell distinguished between programs assigning 
a prescribed number of seats for minority applicants, which he 
ruled unconstitutional, and those merely taking race into account 
as one of many factors in the admissions process, which he ruled 
constitutional. 
The outpouring of scholarly and popular opinion on the issue 
of preferential admissions, as well as affirmative action generally, 
5. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34,553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 
680 (1976), aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
6. 438 U.S. at 355-79. (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun also contributed 
separate opinions, Justice White's focusing on the question of a private right of action 
under title VI, id. at 379-87 (White, J., separate opinion); Justice Marshall's on the need 
to dissipate the effects of black slavery and its vestiges, id. a t  387-402 (Marshall, J., 
separate opinion); and Justice Blackman's on the need to allow universi4ies to consider 
race just as they do other differences, id. a t  402-08 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). 
7. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens' opinion. 
8. Id. at 271. 
9. Id. a t  272. 
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has been even more sharply divided than the Court's decision in 
Bakke. Widely divergent views on the Consitution, justice, and 
the role of the judiciary have created the appearance of a philo- 
sophical free-for-all.1° And while Bakke has by no means quieted 
the donnybrook, the case did succeed in crystallizing some of the 
questions a t  the heart of the debate. That fact alone makes the 
decision worthy of close attention. 
Moreover, the fundamental and historical disagreement over 
the meaning of equal protection was not resolved in Bakke. Be- 
cause of this, almost no one endorses the decision without qualifi- 
cation. Indeed, only one member of the Court that produced it 
subscribes to it in its entirety. The inability of the Court to adopt 
a single view of the equal protection clause virtually ensured that 
its decision could not be definitive. 
The ambiguity of the wording of the equal protection clausell 
and the unevenness of its application have caused scholars and 
judges to differ sharply as to what the clause means or ought to 
mean.12 Three philosophical views of equal protection have been 
advanced, and nearly all arguments dealing with preferential 
admissions are based on one or more of these views. The following 
subparts attempt to explore the principles and assumptions un- 
derlying the major views of the equal protection clause. 
A. The Utilitarian View: Protection for Socially Useful 
Characteristics 
In its extreme form, the "utilitarian view" does not regard 
race as a category to be accorded especially vigilant protection, 
but instead requires courts to treat racial classifications just as 
they treat classifications based on age, occupation, height, or any 
other characteristic. That is, courts should decide first whether 
10. "No case in recent memory has so fractured the community of human rights 
proponents as this one." Margolis, The Aching Bakke: Is There a Cure?, 51 CONN. B.J. 
417, 418 (1977) (footnote omitted). A total of 58 amicus curiae briefs were filed. Id. at 418 
n.6. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Preferential Minority Admissions Programs 
in State Professional Schooki, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 343 (1977). 
11. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec- 
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 6 1. 
12. "One can advance cogent arguments, buttressed by an impressive array of case 
analysis and significant socio-political or economic theory, both for and against the reverse 
discrimination inherent in preferential minority admissions." Renfrew, Affirmative Ac- 
tion: A Plea for a Rectification Principle, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 597, 598 (1977). 
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the classification will aid or frustrate society's attempts to 
achieve its goals, and then allow or invalidate the classification 
based on that decision. 
The suggestion that the equal protection clause does not af- 
ford race any special protection initially seems so unreasonable 
as to be unworthy of serious consideration. The utilitarian view 
is, however, a t  least plausible in instances where society's major- 
ity attempts to aid a previously disadvantaged minority by creat- 
ing classifications that are to the majority's own detriment. A 
number of commentators have advanced arguments implicitly 
founded upon such a view. For example, some have suggested 
that racial and ethnic backgrounds are relevant factors to be 
considered in evaluating an applicant, and that they may be 
considered by state-supported universities along with such quali- 
fications as letters of recommendation, community service, inter- 
views, leadership capacity, sex, home state,13 "athletic or musical 
ability, personality,"14 and other special needs." This view is rep- 
resented, at least in the case of benign discrimination, by Justice 
Blackmun's comment finding it "ironic" that we should be more 
disturbed "over a program where race is an element of conscious- 
ness," i.e., a basis for selection, than we are over the fact that 
universities have traditionally "given conceded preferences up to 
a point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of 
alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the insti- 
tutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the 
famous, and the powerful. "I6 
Professor Terrance Sandalow has presented what is by far 
the most cogent and persuasive defense of this position: 
"Legislation that employs racial or ethnic criteria is not subject 
to a special constitutional rule. Its validity depends upon a judg- 
ment about whether it will lead us toward or away from the kind 
of society we want."17 In leading toward "the kind of society we 
13. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to 
Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 702-04 (1971). 
14. O'Neil, Racial Preferences and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. 
REV. 925, 945 (1974). 
15. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1176- 
77 (1969). 
16. 438 U.S. at 404 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). 
It cannot be said, however, that Justice Blackmun totally adopted the utilitarian view 
of equal protection, since he joined Justice Brennan's opinion based on the preferential 
view. See note 29 and accompanying text infra. 
17. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and 
the Judicial Role, 42 U .  CHI. L. REV. 653, 682 (1975). 
want, " equal 
The first 
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protection requires two things. 
requirement of equal protection under Sandalow's 
analysis is that every statute be applied to all violators without 
reference to personal differences not specified in the statute. For 
example, a statute forbidding sleeping on park benches, to com- 
port with equal protection guarantees, must be enforced against 
all violators without regard to race, sex, position, wealt'h, or any 
other consideration not mentioned in the statute. Thus, equal 
protection consists of adherence to the terms of the statute.l8 
However, if the equal protection clause is to be preserved as 
an instrument capable of invalidating discriminatory legislation, 
it must be invested with a second, broader meaning. "What the 
equal protection clause does require," writes Sandalow, "is that 
government treat similarly all those who are similarly situated."lV 
The weakness of this prescription is that it does not of itself 
provide any guide to determining when two persons are similarly 
situated. To an extent it is "value free" because it leaves "the 
material principles which determine whether individuals are sim- 
ilarly or differently situated" to "rest upon [unspecified] value 
choices."20 For example, the question of whether a state may treat 
illegitimate children differently from legitimate children for pur- 
poses of intestate distribution cannot be solved by resort to the 
phrase "treat similarly those similarly situated." Some theory 
of concrete values must be applied to determine whether legiti- 
mate and illegitimate children are similarly situated. Yet the 
Supreme Court has frequently invoked equal protection analysis 
without reference to any specific theory. "The Court's failure to 
develop such a theory, during a period of intense use of the clause, 
has left the law of equal protection in intellectual d i~ar ray ."~~ 
If application of the equal protection clause requires refer- 
ence to some substantive set of values, a question arises as to 
what values should be recognized. In the context of university 
admissions this question might be phrased, "What characteris- 
18. Id. at 656. 
19. Id. at 655. '" '[A111 persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' " Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U S .  71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 
(1920)). 
20. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 655. "Now, that similar particular cases, as defined 
by a practice, should be treated similarly as they arise, is part of the very concept of a 
practice; it is involved in the notion of an activity in accordance with rules." Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness, 67 P m o s o ~ m c ~ ~  REV.164,166 (1958), reprinted in H. BEDAU, JUSTICE 
AND EQUALITY 78-79 (1971). See also Lucas, Against Equulity, 40 ~'HILOSOPHY 296 (1965), 
reprinted in H. BEDAU, supra, at 138. 
21. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 662 n.27. 
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tics may be legitimately considered by a state-supported univer- 
sity in evaluating applicants?" 
Race is probably not a legally permissible consideration be- 
cause it is generally accepted that applicants equal in all respects 
other than race are similarly situated. But Sandalow argues that 
the touchstone for evaluating applicants' qualifications should be 
social utility: "To the extent social utility is served, race and 
ethnicity may even be seen as measures of c~mpetence."~~ 
One objection to the social utility standard has been voiced 
by Professor Richard Posner. Rejecting that standard in favor of 
a rule prohibiting "the distribution of benefits and costs by gov- 
ernment on racial or ethnic  ground^,"^ he claims that only such 
a per se rule "is sufficiently precise and objective to limit a 
judge's exercise of personal whim and preferen~e."~~ Sandalow 
counters by insisting that Posner's principle holds no special 
claim to objectivity: 
Value choices necessarily underlie the selection of one or another 
principle, and, absent societal agreement upon either the values 
or the source from which they are to be derived, there is no 
escape from the risk that the principle selected will reflect val- 
ues personal to the judge. The principle Posner would have the 
Court adopt is, thus, neither more nor less "objective" than a 
principle which would sanction minority preferences? 
In other words, Sandalow argues that Posner's standard is 
also based on subjective valuations, and that there are other prin- 
ciples than the one Posner suggests that are no less objective, but 
that still sanction minority preferences. A rule requiring state 
universities to prefer qualified blacks to equally or better quali- 
fied whites would be such a rule. Adopting this rule would limit 
judicial capriciousness in a way similar to the way Posner's per 
se rule would. However, no matter how objective the rules are, the 
question of which rule to apply is, Sandalow asserts, necessarily 
subjective. The social utility standard is thus intended to be 
transmaterial: its function is to provide some benchmark by 
which the judge can select among material principles. 
There are a t  least two difficulties with the social utility 
standard. Firstly, the standard itself is not a material principle, 
22. Id. at 674. 
23. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential neatment 
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (1975). 
24. Id. 
25. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 677. 
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but rather a hollow form into which each individual must pour 
his own values. Whenever a formula which is not itself a material 
principle is appealed to as an evaluative standard, some other 
concrete set of values-a material principle-must implicitly be 
invoked. Sandalow's solution is therefore circular. He recom- 
mends the social utility standard as a means by which a judge 
can select one material principle from a pool of equally objective 
material principles. However, the judge must first implicitly or 
explicitly invoke one of the material principles because until he 
does the social utility standard is meaningless. Sandalow would 
therefore insist that the judge select a principle in order to know 
which principle to select. For example, "race is irrelevant" and 
"minorities ought to be preferred" are both material principles. 
To the judge who must decide which to apply, Sandalow recom- 
mends the one that will lead to the desired kind of society. And 
what kind of a society is desired? The answer to that question 
depends on the judge's subjective preferences. 
The second difficulty with the social utility standard as a 
guide by which to select a material principle is that, even while 
it does not of itself favor any material principle, it seems to fore- 
close certain types of arguments that might be made for or 
against the selection of a particular material principle. The very 
term "social utility" implies that the judge engaged in the selec- 
tion process must justify his ultimate choice in utilitarian terms. 
Nearly any material principle, certainly Posner's per se rule, can 
and perhaps ought to be defended on utilitarian grounds. But 
why must courts refuse to entertain or offer justifications based 
on other grounds? For example, fairness and justice are also rea- 
sonable justifications for selecting a material principle. Unques- 
tionably, the problem of preferential admissions has ayery pron- 
ounced moral dimension, and whatever disposition courts make 
of the matter ought to comport with generally held notions of 
justice and fairness. Ignoring the moral dimension of the problem 
puts one in the position of the utilitarian who, as John Rawls 
observes, may argue "that slavery is unjust on the grounds that 
the advantages to the slaveholder as slaveholder do not counter- 
balance the disadvantages to the slave and to society a t  large."26 
By insisting that whatever rule is adopted be adopted on the 
ground that it will lead toward the desired kind of society, Sanda- 
low overlooks one of the premises of moral action: the end cannot 
26. Rawls, supra note 20, at 188, reprinted in H .  BEDAU, supra note 20, at 96. 
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justify the means. Justice requires that the means be scrutinized 
independently of the ends, and that no end, however laudable, be 
pursued by unjust methods. It is this notion that lies at the heart 
of most of the safeguards of criminal procedure. 
While Sandalow's analysis is useful in explaining judicial 
behavior, it cannot direct or restrain a court attempting to inter- 
pret the Constitution. A constitutional guarantee based on social 
utility is too fluid a guarantee; an aggrieved party is at the mercy 
of the court's subjective judgment, unrestrained by any material 
principle, as to the social utility of the alleged constitutional 
violation. Although today it may serve social utility to include 
minorities in professional schools, not long ago many believed 
that it served social utility to exclude them. In that day, a social 
utility standard would have permitted unrestrained discrimina- 
tion. Such a standard inevitably countenances official capricious- 
ness, especially in close cases, and thereby reduces a constitu- 
tional right to a systematically applied judicial whimsy.27 
B. The Preferential View: Enhanced Protection for Minority 
Races Only 
This second view of the equal protection clause dictates that 
only "invidious" racial classifications are subject to the Court's 
"strict scrutiny'' test; "benign" discrimination need only meet 
some lower standard of review. Under traditional two-tier equal 
protection analysis, this lower standard would be the "rational 
basis" test, which validates any classification for which a rational 
basis can be found.28 An intermediate standard has also been 
suggested for use in benign discrimination cases. The Brennan 
opinion in Bakke, for example, argued that "benign" racial classi- 
fications, in order to pass constitutional scrutiny, " 'must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially re- 
lated to achievement of those objectives.' "" 
27. Or, put another way, the view is reminiscent of Ambme Bierce's definition of 
"lawful": "Compatible with the will of a judge having jurisdiction." A. BIERCE, THE 
D m ' s  D I ~ O N A R Y  75 (1958). 
28. That standard has been recommended for reverse discrimination cases. Willey, 
The Case for Preferential Admissions, 21 How. L.J. 175, 201-08 (1978). 
29. 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).TFiis6raniof 
review would be "strict and searching," though not " ' "strict" in theory and fatal in 
fact.' " Id. at 362 (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
Others have advanced such an intermediate standard. For example, the New York 
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Regardless of which lower standard is adopted for nonpre- 
ferred groups, the key feature of the "preferential view" is that it 
applies the highest level of judicial review only to "invidious" 
discrimination. Invidious is used to characterize discrimination 
directed toward certain racially or ethnically defined groups that 
is accompanied by "stigmatization." The legal result of this for- 
mulation is to accord members of stigmatized minority groups 
preferred status in equal protection cases. 
I .  Indicia of suspectness 
One theory upon which the preferential view of equal protec- 
tion is based may be described using the term "indicia of suspect- 
ness." This theory holds that the reason the Court has policed 
and invalidated governmental actions evidencing racial discrimi- 
nation with such vigor is not because racial discrimination is in 
itself illegal or unconstitutional, but rather because the groups 
discriminated against bear certain marks of victimization. Under 
this theory, establishing the existence of those marks is a prere- 
quisite to the Court's applying its strictest scrutiny. The following 
statement is typical of this position: 
There are three traditional explanations for the suspectness of 
racial classifications provided by Supreme Court decisions. 
First, such classifications are the product of pervasive and his- 
toric discrimination. Second, their effect is to stigmatize and 
stereotype individuals belonging to groups identifiable because 
they share immutable characteristics. Lastly, the groups so clas- 
sified have been politically powerless and, thus, unable to pro- 
tect sufficiently their interest? 
Such arguments can often be traced to a statement in Sun Anto- 
nio Independent School District u. Rodriguez: 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines 
have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is 
Court of Appeals, in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, ruled that "benign" classifica- 
tions must serve a "substantial state interest" which "need not be urgent, paramount or 
compelling." 39 N.Y.2d 326, 335-36, 348 N.E.2d 537,545,384 N.Y.S.2d 82,90 (1976). See 
also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98 (1973) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law 
School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L REV. 559,565-79 (1975); Project, Preferential Admissions 
to Professional Schools: The Equal Protection Challenge, 22 VILL. L. REV. 983, 1004-07 
(1977). 
30. Case Comment, Bakke v. The Regents of the University of California: Preferen- 
tial Racial Admissions, An Unconstitutional Approach Paved with Good Intentions?,'l2 
NEW ENC. L. REV. 719, 739 (1977) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Preferential 
Racial Admissions]. 
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not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history 
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position 
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protec- 
tion from the majoritarian political process.31 
In United Jewish Organizations u. Carey,32 Justice Brennan re- 
ferred to these indicia as the "considerations that historically led 
us to treat race as a constitutionally 'suspect' method of classify- 
ing individuals. 
The approach is fraught with difficulties. First of all, it as- 
cribes to the reasoning in the Court's previous discrimination 
cases a major premise which differs from that historically em- 
ployed by the Court. Many commentators and some justices3' 
argue that the Court's decisions invalidating racially discrimina- 
tory practices have been based on a syllogism such as this: (1) the 
Constitution prohibits state action that discriminates by stigma- 
tizing members of victimized, discrete, and powerless minorities; 
(2) the state action in question discriminates by stigmatizing 
members of a victimized, discrete, and powerless minority; and 
therefore, (3) the Constitution prohibits the state action in ques- 
tion. 
Brennan's opinion in Bakke cited a number of cases support- 
ing the proposition that "[only] racial classifications that stig- 
matize . . . are invalid without more," which he called "our prior 
analytic f rame~ork ."~  Those cases do not, however, establish the 
31. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Caro- 
lene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), is also commonly cited in support of this 
position. See, e.g., Broderick, Beferential Admissions and the Brown Heritage, 8 N.C. 
CENT. L.J. 123, 148 n.116 (1977); Maltz, Justice Rehnquist at the Crossroads-Principle, 
Politics, and the Bakke Case, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 922, 923 (1977); Renfrew, supra note 12, 
a t  603; 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 238, 263 n.169 (1977). 
The extraordinary popularity of the footnote in the race area has come about despite 
the fact that it is found in a case dealing with the interstate shipment of "filled milk" 
and also the fact that it never reached a cmclusion: "Nor need we enquire . . . whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
32. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
33. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). He also referred to them in Bakke. 
438 U.S. at 356-60 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). .--- - 
34. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. a t  357-58 (Brennan, White, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
35. Id. It has been suggested that "[wlith the exception of Justice Rehnquist, all 
current members of the Court have demonstrated a degree of commitment to [the indicia 
of suspectness test]." Maltz, supra note 31, at 923. However, none of the cases Maltz cites 
in support of the proposition were race cases. 
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proposition that stigmatization or invidiousness is necessary to 
trigger strict scrutiny. Most often, those factors are mentioned to 
demonstrate that the racial classification under consideration 
had no legitimate purpose (i.e., a compelling interest independ- 
ent of the classification itself). Because all racial discrimination 
that is not necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose is unconsti- 
tutional, and no invidious purpose is ever legitimate, invidious 
racial discrimination is always unconstitutional. But it is the 
absence of a legitimate purpose, and not the presence of an invidi- 
ous one, that fatally flaws a racial classification. This interpreta- 
tion is borne out by an examination of the cases cited by the 
Brennan opinion in Bakke. 
In Yick Wo v. hop kin^,^^ for example, the Court declared: 
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is 
shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for 
it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the 
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not jusiti- 
fied. The discrimination is . . . illegal?' 
The discrimination was illegal because "no reason for it [was] 
shown." The Court mentioned hostility only to demonstrate that 
no justifiable reason for the discrimination existed. Korematsu v. 
United States3s presented a similar situation. When the Court 
wrote, "[olur task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a 
case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentra- 
tion camp because of racial prejudi~e,"~@ they could not have 
meant that strict scrutiny applies only where the discriminatory 
classification is the result of racial prejudice. If that were what 
they believed, they would not have applied strict scrutiny in the 
case before them, since-as demonstrated by the language 
quoted-they did not consider the classification in that case to be 
the result of prejudice.40 In other words, the use of the strict 
scrutiny standard indicates that the Court believed this standard 
should apply even when the classification was not invidious. By 
referring to racial prejudice they were merely restating what the 
36. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
37. Id. at 374. 
38. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
39. Id. at 223. 
40. Indeed, the Korematsu Court's own statement of the standard belies Justice 
Brennan's interpretation: "[Alll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all svch restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." 
Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
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Yick Wo Court had declared: if the purpose of the classification 
is to malign, the case is easy because no further scrutinization of 
the purpose is necessary. Likewise, Strauder v. West Virginia41 
did not establish that only discrimination victims who are mem- 
bers of stigmatized minorities are entitled to the strictest judicial 
scrutiny. The discrimination victims in Strauder were denied the 
right to serve on juries. That they were black evoked the following 
language from the Court, which seems to support the Rodriguez 
model: 
[Tlhe words of the [fourteenth] amendment, it is true, are 
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a posi- 
tive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,-the 
right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them dis- 
tinctively as colored,-exemption from legal discriminations, 
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of 
their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discrimi- 
nations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition 
of a subject race.42 
However, the Court went on to say, "that the West Virginia stat- 
ute . . . is such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor 
would it be if the persons excluded by it were white men. 
Brennan's opinion in Bakke also referred to a passage in 
Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Oyarna v. Cali f~rnia ,~~ a 
case dealing with an alien's right to transfer land. Justice Murphy 
used rational basis language to describe the "rare cases" in which 
a state may 
single out a class of persons, such as ineligible aliens, for distinc- 
tive treatment. . . . 
Such a rational basis is completely lacking where, as here, 
the discrimination stems directly from racial hatred and intoler- 
ance. The Constitution of the United States . . . insists that our 
government . . . shall respect and observe the dignity of each 
individual, whatever may be the name of his race, the color of 
his skin or the nature of his beliefs.45 
The only language in this passage that seems to indicate a special 
rule for invidious discrimination is Justice Murphy's reference to 
racial hatred, a purpose that is insufficient to withstand strict or 
41. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
42. Id. at 307-08. 
43. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
44. 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
45. Id. at 663. 
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any other sort of scrutiny. On the other hand, the last passage 
quoted implies that all discrimination victims are entitled to lit- 
erally "equal" protection. 
Brennan's Bakke opinion also cited Brown u. Board of 
EducationM to bolster its view that only those classifications that 
stigmatize minorities are subject to strict scrutiny. A close read- 
ing of the case reveals, however, that the Court resorted to the 
stigma concept not as a prerequisite to applying strict judicial 
scrutiny, but for a very different purpose. In that case, Chief 
Justice Warren wrote the following: 
In the instant cases . . . there are findings below that the Negro 
and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being 
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications 
and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our deci- 
sion, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these 
tangible factors . . . . We must look instead to the effect of 
segregation itself on public ed~cation.~? 
Why could the Court's opinion not turn on the mere fact that the 
schools were segregated? Why did the Court feel that it had to 
look elsewhere for a foothold from which to invalidate the 
segregation? In 1954 the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy 
u. Fergu~on~~ had been well established for over half a century. 
Brown did not, in principle, repudiate it." Instead, the Court 
used the Plessy analysis to show that where the separation was 
racially motivated equality was impossible. What the "separate 
but equal" doctrine required was something akin to standing: the 
complainant had to show that he was in fact harmed, or in other 
words, that his facilities were not equal. Thus, if the school he 
attended was as well equipped and staffed as any other school, 
he could show no harm, and so was not entitled to relief. Brown 
fell squarely within that framework." Brown differed from Plessy 
only by finding, in the very fact of segregation, a harm; because 
the Brown Court found that harm, it panted relief. The harm it 
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
47. Id. at 492 (footnotes omitted). 
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
49. "The Court dodged a direct challenge to Plessy by holding that segregated public 
schools are, as an empirical matter, 'inherently unequal.' " Zimmer, Beyond DeFunis: 
Disproportionate Impact Analysis and Mandated "Preferences" in Law School 
Admissions, 54 N.C.L. REV. 317, 354 (1976). 
50. Indeed, the slogan-like sentence which crystallized the meaning of 
Brown-"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," 374 U.S. at 495-is cast 
in terms of the Plessy formula. 
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found was, of course, the psychological debilitation allegedly suf- 
fered as a result of the stigma implied in segregation. There is no 
implication in the case that the finding of stigma was in any way 
prerequisite to strictest scrutiny; on the contrary, the stigma was 
the harm against which the Constitution protected the plaintiffs. 
Brown does not support the Brennan opinion's thesis that only 
stigmatizing classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. 
The racial classifications invalidated in the above cases were 
expressions of racial animqs. It does not follow, however, that the 
purpose behind a statute defines the reviewing court's level of 
scrutiny. It cannot be said that an invalid racial classification 
that was based on prejudice was invalidated only because it was 
based on racial prejudice. Nor can one conclude that the Court 
ought to validate all classifications that are not based on invidi- 
ous racial prejudice. None of the cases from Brennan's Bakke 
opinion discussed to this point forecloses the Court from consis- 
tently invoking strict scrutiny in a reverse discrimination case.51 
Finally, the Brennan opinion cited United Jewish Organiza- 
tions v. Carey? The case is admittedly problematical. The State 
of New York was required under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to 
reapportion the voting districts in three counties and to secure the 
U.S. Attorney General's approval of the redistricting plan. Voting 
district lines under the plan were drawn to ensure that blacks and 
Puerto Ricans, as a group, would constitute a 65% majority in a 
predetermined number of districts. The purpose of the reappor- 
tionment was to allow the relative political strength of the minori- 
ties to be reflected in the state senate and assembly. An inciden- 
tal result of the redistricting plan was the splitting of an enclave 
of Hasidic Jews, whose community had previously been con- 
tained in a single voting district, into two districts. Had the Jews 
remained in a single district, the goal of 65% would have been 
missed by 1.6% in one of the districts." The Jewish community, 
whose voting strength had thus been diluted, raised an equal 
protection challenge. The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion 
by Justice White, upheld the plan. 
The Court did not deal with the Jewish community as a 
minority group (although it was apparently "discrete and insu- 
51. The Breman opinion in Bakke also cited three other cases which yield to the same 
analysis: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); 
and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 438 U.S. at 358. 
52. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
53. Id. at 182 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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lar"54); rather, the Court treated the complainants merely as 
members of the white population. As a result, it found no harm: 
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation, the 
State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But its 
plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites 
or any other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . [Tlhere was no fencing out 
of the white population from participation in the political pro- 
cesses of the county." 
Justice White's language is critical. Although he mentions "racial 
slur" and "stigma," those elements are not treated as necessary 
components of an equal protection challenge. Had he written, "its 
plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites 
or any other race, and so we discern no discrimination violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment," the opinion would have provided 
considerable support for Justice Brennan's position in Bakke. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the voting plan easily 
withstood the fourteenth amendment attack. There are, however, 
a t  least two critical factors present in United Jewish 
Organizations that were absent in Bakke. The first is the essen- 
tially remedial action taken under the Voting Rights Act. The 
provision of the Act requiring New York's reapportionment plan 
to be submitted to the U.S. Attorney General was applied 
"whenever it was administratively determined that certain condi- 
tions which experience had proved were indicative of racial dis- 
crimination in voting had existed in the area."" Furthermore, 
there was evidence that voting in the counties "was racially polar- 
ized and that the district lines had been created with the purpose 
or effect of diluting the voting strength of nonwhites (blacks and 
Puerto R i ~ a n s ) . " ~ ~  United Jewish Organizations is, therefore, 
"properly viewed" as a validation of a "remedy for an administra- 
tive finding of dis~rimination."~~ There was no such finding of 
past discrimination in Bakke. 
Secondly, as Justice White observed, "there was no fencing 
out of the white population from participation in the political 
processe~"~~ in United Jewish Organizations. Even the complain- 
54. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
55. Id. at 165 (White, J., separate opinion). 
56. Id. at 156-57. Here, those conditions were an English literacy test and less than a 
50% voter turnout in the 1968 presidential election. Id. 
57. Id. at 149-50. 
58. 438 U.S. at 305. 
59. 430 U.S. at 165. 
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ants argued only that the state had diluted, not destroyed, their 
voting strength. On the other hand, under preferential programs 
like the one in Bakke, "some individuals are excluded from a 
state-provided benefit-admission to the Medical School-they 
otherwise would receive. "60 
In short, while Justice Brennan's attempt to establish the 
Rodriguez indicia of suspectness test as the "analytic framework" 
within which all equal protection cases are decided seems to find 
more support in United Jewish Organizations than in the other 
cases cited in his opinion, that case too falls far short of demon- 
strating that stigma or the other elements mentioned in 
Rodriguez are necessary preconditions to the invocation of strict 
scrutiny. Taken as a whole, the cases cited in the Brennan opin- 
ion are less susceptible to neat categorization than the opinion's 
treatment would suggest. Indeed, Justice Powell challenged the 
characterization: 
This tationale . . . has never been invoked in our decisions as a 
prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict 
scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and insular- 
ity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a partic- 
ular classification is invidious. . . . Racial and ethnic classifi- 
cations . . . are subject to stringent examination without regard 
to these additional  characteristic^.^^ 
As Justice Powell pointed out, the legacy of the Court's deci- 
sions describes a syllogism more like this: (1) the Constitution 
prohibits unjustified state action that discriminates against indi- 
viduals on the basis of race; (2) the state action in question unjus- 
tifiably discriminates against individuals on the basis of race; and 
therefore, (3) the Constitution prohibits the state action in ques- 
tion. Landmark cases support this model.62 Several pronounce- 
ments are significant. "What is [the equal protection clause] but 
declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the 
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, 
60. 438 U.S. at 305. 
61. Id. at 290. 
62. It may be argued that Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its 
progeny demonstrate that "racial classifications are apparently not invalid per se." Pro- 
ject, Referential Admissions to Professional Schools: The Equal Protection Challenge, 22 
Vu. L. REV. 983, 993 (1977). Justice Powell, in Bakke, pointed out thatthese cases,-as 
well as the employment discrimination cases, are "inapposite," primarily because they 
all "involved remedies for clearly determined constitutional violations." 438 U.S. at 300. 
Brennan disagreed strenuously. Id. at 362-66 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, 
JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
EQUAL PROTECTION AND BAKKE 
shall stand equal before the  law^."^ "These provisions are univer- 
sal in their application, to all persons within the territorial juris- 
diction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nati~nality."~~ "The law regards man as man, and takes no ac- 
count of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are inv~lved."~ 
"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are 
by their very nature odious to a free p e ~ p l e . " ~  "Racial classifica- 
tions are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious.' "" " At the very 
least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifica- 
tions, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 
'most rigid scrutiny.' 
These statements are all dicta, but there were, after all, no 
precedents for Bakke. The argument for preferential admissions 
programs based on statements like the one from Rodriguez is 
similarly an attempt to impute meaning to the equal protection 
clause by examining cases interpreting it in other contexts. The 
statements quoted above demonstrate that the Court has also 
recognized another analytical strand: the state should treat all 
persons without regard to their race. 
Of course, even if the indicia of suspectness model does de- 
part from the Court's historical view, it can reasonably be argued 
that part of the role of the Supreme Court is to fashion new ways 
of dealing with constitutional problems in order to accommodate 
society's changing needs. The indicia of suspectness formula was, 
however, not so fashioned. Indeed, Rodriguez, which set forth the 
indicia, was not a race case at all, but a case dealing with an equal 
protection challenge based on poverty. There the Court looked to 
the race cases for a rationale to transplant into the poverty con- 
text. The three-prong test it finally set forth was not, however, 
borrowed from the race cases, for they applied no such test. The 
Rodriguez formulation merely described the groups that had re- 
63. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880). 
64. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
65. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
66. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US. 81, 100 (1943). 
67. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 US.  683, 687 (1963) (quoting Steele v. Louisville & 
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944)). 
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
69. Hence, it is not at all evident that "[tlhe case law is clear," as is argued by one 
commentator. Baldwin, DeFunis v. Odegaard, The Supreme Court and Beferential Law 
School Admissions: Discretion is Sometimes Not the Better Part of Valor, 27 U. Fh. L. 
REV. 343, 360 (1975). 
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ceived the protection of the equal protection clauses in the race 
cases. 
Although the Rodriguez formulation is often invoked without 
e~plana t ion ,~~ its value as a threshold hurdle that the plaintiff 
must surmount in order to obtain strict judicial scrutiny is not 
self-evident. It is not self-evident, for example, why a plaintiff 
who has been victimized by discriminatory state practices ought 
to be required to show that his progenitors were similarly victim- 
ized. Nor is it evident why a plaintiff who can demonstrate he has 
suffered a material harm as a result of state discrimination ought 
to be required to demonstrate that he also suffered a psychologi- 
cal harm, such as stigmatization or stereotyping. Finally, it is not 
evident why a plaintiff who has been denied a benefit on account 
of his race ought also to be denied judicial redress simply because 
he belongs to a group that does not generally lack political power. 
The first two prongs of the test, historic discrimination and 
stigmatization, are rarely defended at length. However, Professor 
John Hart Ely has offered a reason for making membership in a 
group that is politically powerless a prerequisite to full equal 
p ro te~t ion .~~ Ely proposes that strict scrutiny should not apply 
"[wlhen the group that controls the decision making process 
classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself," 
since 
[a] White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons 
of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to under- 
estimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those of 
others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative 
classification that would extend to certain Whites the advan- 
tages generally extended to Blacks.72 
Ely's point is thus twofold. First, strict scrutiny ought to apply 
where the rulemaking body acts out of prejudice, underestimates 
the needs of the racial group deprived of a benefit by the classifi- 
cation, or overestimates the costs of alternative classifications. 
Second, rather than investigating those three factors each time 
the Court is faced with a racial classification, the Court would be 
justified in applying the majority-minority formulation, which is 
70. 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d-34, 553-P2d 
1152, 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Broderick, supra note 31, 
at 164-65; Willey, supra note 28, at 210-12; 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 238, 263 (1977). 
71. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 
723 (1974). 
72. Id. at 735. 
251 EQUAL PROTECTION AND BAKKE 43 
really a short-hand method for presuming the answers to the 
three questions without further investigation. Ely's formulation 
is not an argument explaining why only cases where one or more 
of the three factors are present ought to be strictly scrutinized; 
indeed, he assumes that proposition (although the Court has not). 
Even if he is correct in his assumption, there is still some question 
about the ability of the majority-minority rule to locate the of- 
fending classifications. 
The majority-minority rule will work only if whites formulate 
laws and policies with the view that they ought to be looking out 
for other whites; if, in other words, the sympathies of white poli- 
cymakers may be defined primarily in racial terms. Kent Greena- 
walt has indicated that that conclusion is not justified, a t  least 
in the law school setting. "As most law teachers have done very 
well academically at the undergraduate level as well as in law 
school, " he writes, "they may have trouble identifying themselves 
with marginal applicants." He goes on to say, "Many intellec- 
tuals [in and out of law schools] may actually find it easier to 
identify with the plight of the 'oppressed' than the problems of 
the 'Philistine' middle and lower middle classes."73 Faculty mem- 
bers also will be likely to serve their own interests in minimizing 
time spent in administering admissions programs." This faculty 
interest may conflict with the interest of certain marginal white 
applicants who might be benefited by a more time-consuming 
"alternative classification that would extend to certain Whites 
the advantages generally extended to B l a ~ k s . " ~ ~  
Finally, the majority-minority prescription relies on the as- 
sumption that majority policymakers generally will share what- 
ever burden the majority race is forced to bear. Sharing this bur- 
den will prevent the policymakers from overestimating the costs 
of devising alternative classifications, which they would other- 
wise presumably be likely to do. Again, as Greenawalt has 
pointed out, this assumption is questionable, a t  least in the law 
school setting: "Many law schools have strong preferences for the 
children of faculty members, so teachers are . . . unlikely to 
think of their own children as the potential victims of preferential 
pol i~ies ."~~ In short, Professor Ely's proposal relies too heavily on 
73. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 573-74. 
74. Id. Greenawalt also adds: "Without doubt, some university programs for blacks, 
though I think few admissions preferences, have been adopted after considerable pressure 
that threatened or actually resulted in disruption." Id. 
75. Ely, supra note 71, at 735. 
76. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 573. 
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unwarranted assumptions to establish the proposition that politi- 
cal powerlessness ought to be a prerequisite to the invocation of 
the strict scrutiny standard of review. 
Another major objection to the indicia of suspectness test is 
that i t  makes a constitutional right depend upon membership in 
a particular group,n shifting the focus of constitutional adjudica- 
tion from individual rights to statistical categorie~.~~ The Court 
has traditionally maintained that equal protection is an individ- 
ual right. "It is the individual . . . who is entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws-not merely a group of individuals, or a 
body of persons according to their numbers."79 "The rights cre- 
ated by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its 
terms, guaranteed to the individ~al ."~ "The rights established 
are personal rights? "[Tlhe guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment extend to persons. "" 
On the other hand, the "group rights" theory has paved the 
way for arguments such as Professor Robert O'Neil's: 
Unlike employment quotas and school desegregation orders, 
preferential policies in higher education do not include or ex- 
clude anyone solely on the basis of race. Members of the ethnic 
majority will continue to fill most of the seats in college and 
graduate school classrooms. The effect of increasing the number 
of minority participants is not to bar any white applicant on the 
basis of race, but only to reduce slightly the chances of whites 
whose prospects would be marginal even without a minority 
preference .= 
It is impossible to see how the observation that "members of 
the ethnic majority will continue to fill most of the seats" in the 
Davis Medical School, for example, could lead to the conclusion 
that Allan Bakke was not excluded "solely on the basis of race." 
If Bakke was refused admission because of his race, it is unclear 
what relevance the treatment of other whites might have on his 
constitutional challenge. It might be argued that Bakke was not 
excluded on account of his race, since he was free to compete for 
the eighty-four seats available to whites. But this line of reason- 
77. See Brief for Respondent at 31-36, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). 
78. T. SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RECONSIDERED 43 (1975). 
79. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941). 
80. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). 
81. Id. 
82. 438 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). 
83. O'Neil, supra note 14, at 940. 
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ing misses the crucial point that the constitutionally significant 
question is not which seat he was denied, but why he was denied 
it. It would be preposterous but equally logical to conclude that 
if one black out of every thousand were forced to the back of the 
bus, the nondiscriminatory treatment received by the other 999 
would somehow neutralize this one instance of racial discrimina- 
tion. As Justice Powell pointed out in Bakke, "The guarantee of 
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one 
individual and something else when applied to a person of an- 
other color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it 
is not equal."" 
Justice Powell noted a further difficulty with the concept of 
group rights: determining which minority groups to recognize as 
deserving preferential protection. He insisted that "[tlhere is no 
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit 
'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not."85 In trying 
to make such a decision, the Court would face a number of thorny 
sociological problems. What degree of discrimination must a mi- 
nority group suffer before a racial classification that disadvan- 
tages it can be characterized as "invidious"? How are prejudice 
and discrimination measured? May a group lose its preferred 
status as the impact of preferential programs begins to be felt? 
May a group regain that status once it is lost? The analysis neces- 
sary to deal adequately with such questions does not, Justice 
Powell concluded, "lie within the judicial competence."" 
2. The legislative history 
A second theory supporting the preferential view argues that 
the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment justifies pre- 
ferring blacks over whites in state university admissions." In 
1868, the argument goes, whites had no need of special amend- 
ments to secure their rights to equal protection of the laws. But 
blacks, because of their previous condition of servitude, were in 
special need of the amendment to secure their civil rights. There- 
fore, although the equal protection clause does not actually men- 
tion blacks, they are the special interest of that clause. As Justice 
84. 438 U.S. at 289-90. 
85. Id. at 296. 
86. Id. at 297. 
87. "It is plain that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to prohibit mea- 
sures designed to remedy the effects of the Nation's past treatment of Negroes." 438 U.S. 
at 396-97 (Marshall, J., separate opinion). 
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Miller wrote in the Slaughter-House Casess8 in 1873: 
On the most casual examination of the language of [the thir- 
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth] amendments, no one can fail 
to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them 
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of 
them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of 
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that free- 
dom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen 
from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlim- 
ited dominion over him.89 
To argue that the fourteenth amendment today ought to protect 
whites even when doing so works to the disadvantage of its origi- 
nal beneficiaries is thus said to "stand the equal protection clause 
on its head."90 
Alexander Bickel has demonstrated that section 1 of the four- 
teenth amendment "carried out the relatively narrow objectives 
of the Moderates, and hence, as originally understood, was meant 
to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscege- 
nation statutes, nor segregation."" In fact, a specific formulation 
of civil rights (including desegregation) would almost certainly 
have failed adoption.92 The purpose of the fourteenth amendment 
was, in Sandalow's words, "[flreedom, not e q ~ a l i t y . " ~ ~  Raoul 
Berger adds that racism and fierce opposition to social and politi- 
cal equality were widespread in the North as well as the South, 
infecting the amendment's supporters as well as its opponents." 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the framers in- 
tended the fourteenth amendment to protect, in addition to 
newly freed slaves, southern whites who, because of their sympa- 
thy with the Union, were in danger of discriminatory treatment 
a t  the hands of the southern state  legislature^.^^ In short, the idea 
that blacks should be given preferential treatment in state uni- 
88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
89. Id. a t  71. 
90. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An 
Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 357 (1974). 
91. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAW. L. 
REV. 1, 58 (1955). 
92. Id. at 61-62. 
93. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 665. The amendment was designed merely to incorpo- 
rate into the Constitution the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. R. BERGER, GOVERN- 
MENT BY JUDICIARY 166-92 (1977). 
94. R. BERGER, supra note 93, a t  12-16, 27-36. 
95. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Preferential Minority Admissions Pro- 
grams in State Professional Schools, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 343, 353 & nn. 47-51 (1977). 
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versities would have struck the amendment's framers as 
"bizarre"96 if not incon~eivable.~~ 
On the other hand, Justice Marshall argued in Bakke that 
the Congress of 1868 was indeed willing to see the interests and 
rights of whites subordinated to those of the newly freed slaves. 
He observed that the same Congress that passed the fourteenth 
amendment also passed the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act, 
an act that provided many of its benefits only to Negroes. . . . 
Although the Freedmen's Bureau legislation provided aid for 
refugees, thereby including white persons within some of the 
relief measures, . . . the bill was regarded, to the dismay of 
many Congressmen, as "solely and entirely for the freedmen, 
and to the exclusion of all other persons."B8 
And even though the bill was attacked on the ground that it gave 
blacks special treatment unavailable to many whites, Congress 
overrode President Johnson's veto to make it law. However, the 
Freedman's Bureau Act was not designed to benefit succeeding 
generations of blacks or, as Justice Marshall seems to imply in 
some passages, blacks generally;" its primary purpose was to aid 
newly freed slaves in their extraordinarily difficult transition 
from slavery to freedom. 
Justice Marshall concluded that the "intent of the Framers" 
was to achieve "genuine equality" rather than merely "abstract 
equality."loO He apparently used the term "abstract equality" to 
refer to legal equality, and the term "genuine equality" to refer 
to social, financial, educational, and occupational equality. In 
view of the formidable evidence to the contrary, which Justice 
Marshall does not acknowledge,lo1 the legislative history of a sin- 
gle limited legislative enactment cannot justify the conclusion 
that the 1868 Congress intended the fourteenth amendment to 
achieve such extra-legal equality. The most that can consistently 
be said of those who enacted the fourteenth amendment was that 
they intended it to allow, rather than achieve, such equality. 
96. Posner, supra note 23, at 21. 
97. Bickel theorized that the wording of the equal protection clause was intended by 
the Radicals to be sufficiently ambiguous to allow for future manipulation of the clause. 
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 63 (1962). For an analysis of that hypothesis, 
see R. BERGER, supra note 93, a t  99-116. 
98. 438 US. at 397 (Marshall, J., separate opinion) (citations omitted). 
99. See id. at 398. 
100. Id. 
101. Indeed, the portion of the Marshall opinion which claims to look a t  the history 
of the fourteenth amendment does not even refer to that history; it is devoted exclusively 
to the history of the Freemen's Bureau Act. Id. at 397-98. 
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There is also a loosely constructed argument that looks not 
a t  the framers' intent, but only a t  its direction. Since the framers 
moved toward extending greater legal benefits to blacks,lo2 the 
argument runs, all further extentions of benefits are historically 
justifiable. This position is problematical for two reasons. First, 
it requires a court to claim historical sanction for an opinion that 
would never have been approved by those historical figuqes to 
whom the court looks for support. The difficulty is not dispelled 
by the insistence that the Court would only be harvesting the 
fruit of the seed first planted by the framers. On what ground can 
the framers' desire to move in a particular direction be consis- 
tently taken more seriously than their desire not to move any 
further in that direction? One ground might be that society has 
moved farther in that direction than the framers were willing to 
move. That explanation may be justifiable, but it is not histori- 
cal, and should not be accorded the weight that an appeal to 
legislative history provides. 
A second basic problem with this contention is that it pro- 
vides no fixed limits on the exercise of judicial discretion. Thus, 
such a rule of interpretation suggests no logical stopping point 
beyond which the Court must not push the "intent" of the fra- 
mers. The Court is no longer required to ask what the legislative 
history dictates, but only what it allows. And by taking the quasi- 
historical view that it allows any state action that benefits blacks, 
the Court can insulate itself from genuinely historical objections. 
The effect is to shroud an utterly unhistorical view with apparent 
historical legitimacy while dismissing the truly historical view as 
unhistorical. 
C. The Symmetrical View: Equal Protection for All Races 
A third view of the equal protection clause, which might be 
referred to as the "symmetrical view," dictates that all govern- 
mental practices that discriminate on the basis of race be subject 
to "the most rigid scrutiny."lo3 Such practices can be permitted 
only if they can be shown to further a "compelling state interest" 
and then only if no less restrictive alternative is available.lo4 The 
essential difference between this view of equal protection and the 
preferential view is that the symmetrical view insists that all 
- 
102. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 570-71. 
103. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
104. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
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types of racial discrimination are equally repugnant to the Con- 
stitution, and hence that all racial classifications are equally sus- 
pect. 
For nearly a century, landmark opinions have maintained 
that the equal protection clause prohibits all discriminatory 
treatment on account of race.lo5 It does not, according to those 
decisions, favor particular racial or ethnic groups and give only 
limited protection to all others. In fact, not until the last decade 
has anyone suggested that equal protection might have one-way 
application in the sense that only classifications affecting certain 
racial groups are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The one-way 
application attracted support only after it became apparent that 
the clause might operate to the detriment of minorities by curtail- 
ing affirmative action programs. This hasty reinterpretation of 
the clause has left minority rights advocates vulnerable to the 
criticism described by John Rawls: 
It is not, however, an unnatural extension of the duty of fair play 
to have it include the obligation which participants who have 
knowingly accepted the benefits of their common practice owe 
to each other to act in accordance with it when their perform- 
ance falls due; for it is usually considered unfair if someone 
accepts the benefits of a practice but refuses to do his part in 
maintaining it .Iw 
The principle a t  stake was succinctly stated by Chaim Perel- 
man: "If the judge violates the rules of concrete justice he has 
himself accepted, then he is unjust."lo7 Rawls makes a similar 
point: "[Hlaving a morality is analogous to having made a firm 
commitment in advance; for one must acknowledge the principles 
of morality even when to one's disadvantage. A man whose moral 
judgments always coincided with his interests could be suspected 
of having no morality a t  This definition of morality seems 
to require that minorities acknowledge the principle of law on 
which they have based previous claims, even when doing so is to 
their disadvantage. 
Consequently, the suggestion that the Court should approve 
benign racial discrimination has aroused moral indignation from 
many diverse camps, lW including minorities. 'lo Even advocates of 
p p  - -  - - - 
105. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra. 
106. Rawls, supra note 20, at 180, reprinted in H. BEDAU, supra note 20, at 90. 
107. C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 20 (1963). 
108. Rawls, supra note 20, at 173, reprinted in H. BEDAU, supra note 20, at 84. 
109. See, e.g., Cohen, The DeFunis Case: Race and the Constitution, THE NATION, 
Feb. 1975, at 135; Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 
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such discrimination are not oblivious to its potential for causing 
d i s ~ o m f o r t . ~ ~ ~  There is good reason for such discomfort. Advocates 
of preferential programs are demanding that Americans unlearn 
in the 1970's the moral lesson that was thrust upon them in the 
1960's. An arduous struggle, reflected in marches, songs, rallies, 
stickers, movies, and freedom rides, brought legislation and cul- 
minated finally in the concession of the American nation, that 
race should be a legally neutral fact. The moral force of this 
proposition was irresistible. The watchcry of "equal opportunity" 
in great measure mobilized the hearts and minds of Americans, 
and rightly so. The principle of racial neutrality is one that com- 
ports with a priori notions of equal justice. As Professor Carl 
Cohen has written: "Whenever individuals i re  penalized solely 
because they manifest some adventitious characteristic wholly 
out of their control-their skin color, their national origin, or the 
like-the unfairness arouses strong indignation. Our viscera do 
not mislead us in this; any reasonable standard would certainly 
exclude such uses of racial ~lassification."~~~ H.L.A. Hart comes 
to a similar conclusion in The Concept of Law: 
119 PA. L. REV. 351,353,356 (1970); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality 
for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 380 (1966); 
~avinsky,  A Moment of Truth i n  ~ a c i a l l ~  Based Admissions, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 879, 
881 (1976); Perhacs, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A Look a t  the 
Equal Protection Argument Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 580,600 (1974); 
Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimim- 
tion: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 854 (1967). 
110. See, e.g., McPherson, The Black Law Student: A Boblem of Fidelities, THE 
ATLANTIC, Apr. 1975, at 93,100; Sowell, Are Quotas Good for Blacks?, COMMENTARY, June 
1978, at 39. 
Public-opinion polls have repeatedly shown most blacks opposed to preferential 
treatment either in jobs or college admissions. A Gallup Poll in March 1977, for 
example, found only 27 percent of non-whites favoring "preferential treatment" 
over "ability as determined by test scores," while 64 percent preferred the latter 
and 9 percent were undecided. (The Gallup breakdown of the U.S. population 
by race, sex, income, education, etc. found that "not a single population group 
supports affirmative action.") 
Id. 
11 1. For example, Professor Sandalow has commented: 
[Rlacial and ethnic preferences do involve serious dangers. In the end, how- 
ever, a decision concerning their validity cannot avoid a judgment about 
whether they are likely to contribute to or retard development of the kind of 
society we want. In my own judgment, for reasons already explained, the former 
is more likely. It would be foolish to assert that judgment c o n f i d e n t ~ y ; ~ e r .  - - 
If the potential benefits are great, so too are the potential losses. But in the light 
of the seriousness of America's racial problem, the risk seems worth taking, 
however uncomfortable we may be with it. 
Sandalow, supra note 17, at 703. 
112. Cohen, supra note 109, at 141. 
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Indeed so deeply embedded in modern man is the principle that 
prima facie human beings are entitled to be treated alike that 
almost universally where the laws do discriminate by deference 
to such matters as colour and race, lip service a t  least is still 
widely paid to this principle. If such discriminations are at- 
tacked they are often defended by the assertion that the class 
discriminated against lack, or have not yet developed, certain 
essential human attributes; or it may be said that, regrettable 
though it is, the demands of justice requiring their equal treat- 
ment must be overridden in order to preserve something held to 
be of greater value, which would be jeopardized if such discrimi- 
nations were not made.u3 
Alexander Bickel has observed: 
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for a t  least 
a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, im- 
moral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of 
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told 
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a 
matter of whose ox is gored.li4 
In accordance with this fundamental principle minorities have 
rightfully demanded protection from governmental discrimina- 
tion, citing the equal protection clause for the proposition that no 
one should be denied a governmental benefit or suffer a govern- 
mentally imposed penalty because of his race. No special pro- 
phetic powers are needed to predict that when it is argued that 
whites suffering similar governmental discrimination cannot 
avail themselves of similar protection, the demand for an explan- 
ation will be vigorous if not indignant.l15 As stated by the Califor- 
113. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961). 
114. A. BICKEL, THE M o m  OF CONSENT 133 (1975). 
115. Such reaction has not been limited to academic circles: 
The New York Times recently published an editorial endorsement of the reverse 
discrimination that caused the rejection of Allan Bakke by the medical school 
of the University of California a t  Davis. Two weeks later, the New York Times 
turned over the whole of its editorial page to spirited discussions of that stand, 
introduced by an editorial statement that, by a ratio of 15 to 1, the Times' 
readers rejected the Times' logic. 
Buckley, Are We All Conservatives Now?, NATIONAL REVIEW, Aug. 5, 1977, at 904. 
Most Americans oppose granting preferential treatment to minorities and 
women in getting jobs or entering college, according to a recent Gallup Poll. 
The survey found that, despite claims of past and present discrimination, 
81 percent of those questioned felt that ability as measured by test scores should 
be the main consideration in hiring and admitting people to schools. Only 11 
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nia Supreme Court, preferential admissions "represent a retreat 
in the struggle to assure that each man and woman shall be 
judged on the basis of individual merit alone, a struggle which has 
only lately achieved success in removing legal barriers to racial 
e q ~ a l i t y . " ~ ~ ~ m e r i c a n s  remember their earlier lesson well enough 
to sense "a certain irony in climaxing a long struggle in the name 
of equality by demanding inequality. " l7 
Of the three views of the equal protection clause-the utili- 
tarian, the preferential, and the symmetrical-the one best sup- 
ported by fundamental principles of fairness as well as the legacy 
of the Court's pronouncements is the third. But merely adopting 
the symmetrical view does not automatically dispose of the pref- 
erential admissions question. This view does not forbid all racial 
discrimination. It simply requires that the Court apply its strict- 
est standard of review. The strict scrutiny standard requires that 
the state's racial classification, to survive judicial review, be nec- 
essary to serve a compelling state interest. 118 Further inquiry must 
therefore focus on whether or not the interests served by preferen- 
tial admissions programs are sufficiently compelling to justify an 
exception to the general rule forbidding classifications based on 
race. 
percent favored preferential treatment, and 8 percent had no opinion. 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 5, 1977, at 24. 
116. BaMre v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 62-63, 553 P.2d 1152, 1171, 
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 699 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
117. Kaplan, supra note 109, at 364. On the other hand, there is an argument that 
any action taken to eradicate the effects of historical discrimination is moral. Nathan 
Glazer, for example, contends that "any claim for blacks (and in lesser degree for other 
minorities) has an immediate moral force and justification." N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE 
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 207 (1978). While recognizing that 
hard affirmative action measures "could not get the support of Congress today on a 
straight vote, and would certainly not get the support of the majority of the American 
people if asked," Glazer insists that "[tlhey are seen as moral." Id. at 210. He further 
suggests that much of the moral weight of affirmative action programs is accorded them 
by those who "do not want to find themselves in the posture of the South." Id. at 209. I f  
he is right, what he calls moral support would be more accurately described as a fear of 
being unfairly accused of racism, a risk all nonracists run when they support, for moral 
or legal reasons, positions that are supported by racists for racist reasons. The risk is real. 
See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 31, a t  175. See also Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument 
Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 285 (1977). 
118. "It should be noted that 'compelling state interest' in this instance is not synony- 
mous with the general recognition of an important social goal, but rather, with that degree 
of importance which would justify overcoming our traditional abhorrence of racial dis- 
crimination." Brief for Respondent a t  55, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). 
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111. STATE INTERESTS IN PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS 
From the time the Court first applied a heightened scrutiny 
to racial classifications, national survival is the only example of 
interest so vital that the Court has labeled it  ompe pel ling."^^^ 
Korematsu v. United States120 the Court stated: 
[A111 legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all 
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric- 
tions; racial antagonism never can. 12' 
119. As noted in the brief for Allan Bakke: 
This Court has found a basis for sanctioning racial discrimination in only two 
cases. In Korematsu v. United States, and in Hirabayashi u. United States, . . . 
the Court upheld military exclusion and curfew orders directed against Ameri- 
can citizens of Japanese origin. In view of the widespread criticism of these 
cases, it is not clear that even the threat of invasion, espionage, and sabotage 
would justify these racially discriminatory orders were they to be reviewed by a 
present-day court. 
Brief for Respondent at 55 & n.52. See also Greenawalt, supra note 29, a t  567; Renfrew, 
supra note 12, at 605. 
In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court upheld the practice of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs of hiring Indians whenever possible. In doing so, however, the 
Court made clear that the case was sui generis because of the "unique legal status of 
Indians" as well as the "plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of 
Indians . . . drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself." Id. at 551- 
52. The Court emphasized that the BIA's practice was not in fact racial discrimination a t  
all and that the case was not to be considered a precedent to justify future exceptions to 
the constitutional ban on racial discrimination: 
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this preference does not 
constitute "racial discrimination." Indeed, it is not even a "racial" preference. 
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause 
of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of 
its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the 
governing agency. The preference is similar in kind to the Constitutional re- 
quirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an inhabitant of that 
State for which he shall be chosen," Art. I, 8 3, cl. 3, or that a member of a city 
council reside within the city governed by the council. Congress has sought only 
to enable the BIA to draw more heavily from among the constituent groups in 
staffing its projects, all of which, either directly or indirectly, affect the lives 
of tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a dis- 
crete racial group, but rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities 
whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion . . . . 
In the sense that there is no other group of people favored in this manner, the 
legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis. 
Id. at 553-54. Morton v. Mancari is therefore not a suitable guide to the meaning of' the 
term "compelling state interest." 
120. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
121. Id. a t  216. 
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The Court continued: 
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their 
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and 
peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. 
But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are 
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be com- 
mensurate with the threatened danger.122 
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Hirabayashi v. 
United States,123 made it clear that as far as the Court was con- 
cerned, "[tlhe threat of Japanese invasion of the west coast was 
not fanciful but and that "national survival [was] at 
stake."125 These cases established a very rigid standard which was 
not met by any racial classification from World War I1 until 
Bakke. 
Advocates of preferential admissions have advanced four 
major interests that such programs are designed to serve: (1) the 
need to compensate for historical mistreatment of minorities, (2) 
the need for professional services among minorities, (3) the need 
for racial proportionality, and (4) the need for student body diver- 
sity. None of these objectives is without some justification; cer- 
tainly none is advanced frivolously. Most commentators who ad- 
vance them do so out of concern for members of minority races 
and for the nation as a whole. The objectives cannot, therefore, 
be frivolously dismissed, but neither ought they be allowed to 
neutralize a recognized constitutional right without being sub- 
jected to the closest examination. The right to equal protection 
of the laws may not be lightly overridden. The right to be treated 
without regard to one's race is precious and should only be denied 
in deference to a countervailing interest that is truly compel- 
ling. 1 2 ~  
A. Compensating for Historical Mistreatment of Minorities 
Perhaps the argument that has most captivated scholars, 
practitioners, and laymen alike is that preferential admission 
programs are needed to compensate minorities for mistreatment 
122. Id. at 219-20. 
123. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
124. Id. at 105 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
125. Id. at 106. 
126. It has been argued that the compelling state interest test represents a standard 
too high for benign discrimination cases, and that some intermediate standard ought 
therefore to be applied. See note 29 and accompanying text supra. The discussion in the 
text is relevant both to strict scrutiny and to any intermediate standard. 
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they have received at the hands of whites throughout the nation's 
history. The general idea is that "preferential programs are a 
form of compensation, or reparations, to repay these minority 
groups for the harm inflicted upon them in the past by society 
and to compensate them for the benefits which nonminorities 
have reaped as. a result of the deprivations suffered by minori- 
ties."ln This statement emphasizes one strand of the compensa- 
tion argument, namely, that whites owe a debt to minorities be- 
cause whites have unjustly benefited by mistreating minorities. 
The other strand of the argument is typified by the allegation 
that as a result of discrimination minorities are poorly equipped 
to compete on an equal basis, and therefore "evenhanded treat- 
ment cannot yield equal results."128 Professor John Kaplan has 
graphically depicted the argument: 
The treatment-according-to-need argument often uses the 
analogy of a foot-race in which one of the runners has been 
shackled for the entire time. We could not simply remove his 
chains and let the race continue. Not only would he then be far 
behind in the race, but also, from want of exercise and various 
other disabilities, he would be much less able to contin~e.'~" 
In another statement, Professor Kaplan aptly expresses both 
strands of the argument: 
[Slince our white society has enslaved and exploited the 
Negro, leaving him in far worse condition to compete in and 
enjoy the benefits of our society, it is only fair that each victim 
of this wrong be compensated for his injuries-whether or not 
he is presently in need. This is especially so, the argument goes, 
since the white society which damaged the Negro has been un- 
justly enriched by benefiting from slavery and cheap Negro 
labor. In addition, over and above the measurable financial loss 
inflicted, compensation may be claimed for pain, suffering and 
humiliation. There has, indeed, been some precedent for the 
recognition of this type of obligation. We have sought to com- 
pensate American Indians for lands taken away from their 
ancestors and, though to some the comparison may be odious, 
the West German government has paid millions of dollars to 
Israel in reparation for Nazi crimes against Jews. This repay- 
ment of a debt theory avoids the thorny issue of the correspond- 
ence between color and need. Under this view, "the professional 
127. Redish, supra note 90, at 379. 
128. Cohen, supra note 109, at 135. 
129. Kaplan, supra note 109, at 365. 
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Negro, the Negro businessman, and those able to climb the 
ladder despite their handicaps would each be much further 
along than they are if it were not for the immoral practices of 
the white society," and hence are legitimate objects of compen- 
sation.'" 
While the redressing of past injustices has an emotional ap- 
peal, the position is not without its difficulties. For example, 
Karst and Horowitz have pointed out a major problem with the 
compensation theory as it is applied in employment cases. Their 
observation is appropriate to the educational context as well: 
Not only are the beneficiaries of today's preferential quota nor- 
mally not the actual victims of yesterday's discrimination by 
employer or union; it is also difficult to determine whether they 
have been affected even indirectly by the past practices of the 
employer or union in question. On the other side, those who are 
disadvantaged by today's preferential quota normally have not 
been responsible for the past discrimination, and have not prof- 
ited from it. Affirmative action cannot be "compensatory" or 
"remedial" except in the most diffuse sense.131 
Karst and Horowitz focus on two different concerns. First, do 
preferential programs benefit the right people? Second, do prefer- 
ential programs disadvantage the right people? 
Justice Marshall, in Bakke, addressed the first concern by 
insisting that "[ilt is unnecessary in 20th century America to 
have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims 
of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so 
pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has man- 
aged to escape its impact."132 His comment is an answer to the 
objection that the class benefited by today's preferential pro- 
grams is too broad. Since no black has escaped the effects of 
discrimination, no black can be said to be unjustly benefited by 
compensatory programs. 
There is, of course, another objection: the class benefited by 
today's preferential programs is too narrow. Nonblack Americans 
have also suffered discrimination. And, as Posner has observed, 
"when race is used as a proxy for characteristics thought to be 
130. Id. at 365-67 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Morcuse, in EQUALITY 149 (1965)). 
131. Karst and Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, GO-VA,L~REV. 
955, 964-65 (1974). See also Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A 
Jurisprudential  roach; 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 538-39 (1975); Posner, supra note 23, 
at 16. 
132. 438 US. at 400 (Marshall, J., separate opinion). 
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relevant to the educational experience, discrimination against 
people who .have the characteristics (of poverty, cultural handi- 
caps, etc.) but not the racial identity, results."133 His point is this: 
the intention never was to prefer minorities merely because they 
were minorities, but to prefer those who have suffered the effects 
of discrimination. Minority status per se is used as a basis for 
preference only because there is thought to be a high correlation 
between the class of all minorities and the class of all discrimina- 
tion victims.lu However, this approach to identifying discrimina- 
tion victims necessarily denies many actual victims the benefit 
of preferential treatment merely because their racial, ethnic, or 
religious status does not entitle them to official compensation. 
Furthermore, there are many other persons who, although not the 
victims of racial or ethnic prejudices, are similarly disadvantaged 
by circumstances largely beyond their control. 
A just solution might therefore be to prefer applicants of any 
race who can demonstrate that they have suffered the effects of 
discrimination or who are otherwise disadvantaged.'" A typical 
response to this suggestion is that if preferences are accorded on 
the basis of disadvantage rather than race, too few minorities will 
be admitted to professional schools.136 
This objection is valid only if some compelling interest in 
preferring minorities for a reason other than historical disadvan- 
tage, such as promoting student body diversity, exists. If such an 
independent compelling interest were recognized, and if the num- 
ber of minorities admitted under a program based on disadvan- 
tage were significantly lower than under the present system of 
133. Posner, supra note 23, at 14. 
134. Nickel, supra note 131, at 550-51. Professor Nickel suggests a framework for 
analyzing preferential policies by building flexibility into the correlative scheme. Id. a t  
555-58. 
135. It appears that no schools to date have experimented with preferential programs 
based on disadvantage. Lavinsky, supra note 109, a t  880. However, "[o]fficials of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Mexican-American Legal Defense 
Fund have acknowledged that they 'could live with' a program based on disadvantage." 
Id. a t  889 (footnote omitted). 
136. Justice Tobriner, dissenting from the California Supreme Court's decision in 
Bakke, noted: 
Because all disadvantaged students need financial aid, the total number of such 
students a medical school can afford to admit is limited. As a consequence, 
inclusion of all disadvantaged students in the special admission program would 
inevitably decrease the number of minority students admitted under the pro- 
gram and thus curtail the achievement of all integration-related objectives. 
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 90, 553 P.2d 1152, 1190, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. 680, 718 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
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racial preferences, the program would be vulnerable to the criti- 
cism that it was ineffective in serving the recognized state inter- 
est.'" If, on the other hand, it is the disadvantaged status of 
minorities that is being advanced as the compelling state inter- 
est, preferential programs based on disadvantage would not be 
vulnerable to the criticism that they benefited nonminorities as 
much or more than minorities. 
In Bakke, Justice Powell dealt with the issue of whether ben- 
eficiaries of preferential treatment must demonstrate previous 
disadvantage by pointing out that the Court has always required 
at  least a showing of illegal discrimination on the part of the 
employer or school before it would sanction preferential pro- 
grams. He wrote: "After such findings have been made, . . . the 
legal rights of the victims must be vindicated."138 To allow reme- 
dial programs to compensate for "societal discrimination" would 
unduly jeopardize the rights of those who are disadvantaged by 
such programs. For, as Justice Powell also observed, "there is a 
measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons . . . to bear the 
burdens of redressing grievances not of their making. " 1 3 ~  
Greenawalt has proposed a plausible answer to this chal- 
lenge. It is reasonable to assume, he suggests, that if no discrimi- 
nation had ever occurred, many more blacks would qualify for 
admission without the benefit of special preference. Borderline 
whites who are accepted to schools without preferential admis- 
sions policies are therefore the unwitting beneficiaries of others' 
discriminations, even if they are innocent of discrimination them- 
selves. To adopt a preferential policy that excludes them is 
merely to place them "in the position they would have been in if 
the discrimination had never oc~ured."l*~ Strictly speaking, how- 
ever, this argument does not answer Justice Powell's objection. 
What Greenawalt proposes is an allocation of the burdens of com- 
pensation upon the beneficiaries of the wrongdoing rather than 
upon the perpetrators of the wrongs; he does not demonstrate 
that that alternative is fairer than the traditional method of allo- 
cation. There are also additional difficulties with the "unwitting 
beneficiary" theory which become evident when it is applied hy- 
pothetically in other contexts. Should white students' grades be 
137. O'Neil, After DeFunis: Filling the Constitutional Vacuum, 27 U .  FLA. L. REV. 
315, 341; Sandalow, supra note 17, at 690. 
138. 438 U.S. at 307. 
139. Id. at 298. 
140. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 585. 
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discounted on the assumption that the discounted grades are the 
ones they would have received absent discrimination? Ought 
law school class standings be rearranged to reflect what they 
presumably would have been absent discrimination? Should 
white attorneys, when opposing black attorneys, be held to a 
higher standard of proof than their opponents on the assump- 
tion that, absent discrimination, black attorneys would be better 
qualified and hence more likely to persuade the court? These 
examples are more extreme than the preferential admissions 
situation, but they are equally well supported by the "unwitting 
beneficiary" theory. 
There is a further theoretical pitfall in forcing today's nonmi- 
nority students to bear the burden of compensating for historical 
discrimination. In his Bakke opinion, Justice Marshall observed 
cryptically that until 1954, "ours was a Nation where, by law, an 
individual could be given 'special' treatment based on the color 
of his skin."141 The observation is crucial: acts of discrimination 
committed before 1954 were legal.142 Those who committed dis- 
criminatory acts behaved well within their constitutional rights 
as set forth by the Supreme Court. For today's Court to sanction 
a governmental agency's attempts to redress "several hundred 
years of class-based discrimination against Negroes"143 would 
thus require it to permit penalization of nonminorities for actions 
which, a t  the time they were committed, were admittedly legal. 
The court has scrupulously observed this distinction between 
legal and illegal discrimination in applying the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. MoodylU the Court observed: 
"[Ulnder Title W backpay liability exists only for practices 
occuring after the effective date of the Act . . . . Thus no award 
was possible with regard to the plant's pre-1964 policy of 'strict 
segregation.' "14s The limitation that pertains to backpay awards 
pertains also to awards of retroactive seniority. Although Justice 
Marshall strenuously objected, the Court ruled in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters u. United States that "employees who 
suffered only pre-Act discrimination are not entitled to relief, and 
141. 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., separate opinion). 
142. Segregation was legal in public schools, of course, until Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Most discrimination by private institutions is now prohibited by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 247 (codified in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
143. 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., separate opinion). 
144. 422 U S .  405 (1975). 
145. Id. at 410 n.3. 
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no person may be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than 
the effective date of the Act."146 
Ironically, there is also reason to believe that racially prefer- 
ential programs in fact stigmatize the very minority applicants 
they are designed to benefit, including those who would have 
been admitted to the school without preferential ~0nsideration.l~~ 
Justice Douglas recognized this problem in his DeFunis dissent: 
A segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma 
and caste no less than a segregated classroom, and in the end it 
may produce that result despite its contrary intentions. One 
other assumption must be clearly disapproved: that blacks or 
browns cannot make it  on their individual merit. That is a 
stamp of inferiority that a State is not permitted to place on any 
lawyer. lM 
One black law student has written: "[Mlaking the student feel 
special, placing him in a category which takes intellectual limita- 
tions for granted at the start of the ordeal, only makes his struggle 
that much harder, that much more painful."149 Dr. Thomas Sow- 
ell, himself a black, has pronounced this indictment of the prefer- 
ential admissions system: 
Bending a few rules here and there to get the right body count 
of minority students seems a small price to pay for maintaining 
an image that will keep money coming in from the government 
and the foundations. When a few thousand dollars in financial 
aid to students can keep millions of tax dollars rolling in, it is 
clearly a profitable investment for the institution. For the young 
people brought in under false pretense, it can turn out to be a 
disastrous and permanently scarring experience.150 
146. 431 U.S. 324, 356-57 (1977). 
147. See Project, Referential Admissions to Professional Schools: The E q w l  Protec- 
tion Challenge, 22 VILL. L. REV. 983, 1009 (1977). 
In an article in the opinion-editorial section of the New York Times, David L. 
Evans, Senior Admissions Officer of Harvard, complained: "So much has been 
written about the illegitimacy of special recruiting efforts for minority students, 
black students' dissillusionment and 'reverse discrimination' that the mere 
presence of blacks at selective institutions has more and more begun to imply 
substandard credentials." He added:"Black students who come to Harvard far 
too often receive the coolest, most ambivalent reception given to any upwardly- 
mobile ethnic group that has ever entered these ivied walls." N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 
24, 1976, a t  33, col. 1. 
Lavinsky, supra note 109, a t  889 n.57. 
148. 416 U.S. a t  343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
149. McPherson, supm note 110, at 100. 
150. Sowell, supm note 110, at 41. 
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Professor Lino Graglia has indicated that the problem has been 
compounded: 
Some schools have in fact abandoned the factual premise on 
which the programs were originally based and no longer insist 
on undiluted performance standards-lower standards are now 
justifiable. At New York University Law School, for example, a 
special admission program was first adopted in 1966 when the 
school employed an anonymous grading procedure under which 
the identity of the student was not known to the professor until 
after the grade was assigned. After two years, twelve of fifteen 
specially admitted students were not maintaining a passing av- 
erage. A faculty committee reporting on the problem found that 
the special admission program was being "crippled by the rigid- 
ity of the anonymous grading system" and that "(t)he preserva- 
tion inviolate of traditionally narrow canons of academic excel- 
lence recedes into insignificance when confronted with the di- 
mensions of the American crisis of social injustice." It success- 
fully recommended that the grading system be changed to per- 
mit a professor to take into account special admission when a 
student would otherwise receive a failing grade.I5l 
Again, it is not only preferred applicants who suffer the 
stigma, but all minority professionals. For example, both the 
minority applicant who would have been admitted to medical 
school without preferential treatment and the minority student 
a t  a medical school which has no preferential admission program 
may, despite excellent qualifications as practicing physicians, be 
suspected of being less qualified than their white counterparts.152 
In short, "one of the most serious disservices done by lowered 
academic standards for Negroes in institutions of higher learning 
is to call into question the legitimacy of every Negro graduate."lJ3 
As Justice Powell noted in Bakke, "preferential programs may 
only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups 
are unable to achieve success without special protection based on 
a factor having no relationship to individual worth."lJ4 
Another reason why preferential programs are likely to frus- 
trate the interests of minorities is that "by making different rules 
for the white and the Negro [the government] can only increase 
the importance of race in our already race-ridden society."lJ5 Pro- 
151. Graglia, supra note 109, a t  359-60 (footnotes omitted). 
152. See Greenawalt, supra note 29, at  571-72. 
153. Graglia, supra note 109, a t  356. 
154. 438 US. at  298. 
155. Kaplan, supra note 109, a t  380. 
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fessor Ralph Winter has observed: 
In any event, preferential programs are fundamentally 
countereducative on the basic issue of racial discrimination it- 
self. Instead of helping to eliminate race from politics, they 
inject it. Instead of teaching tolerance and helping those forces 
seeking accommodation, they divide on a racial basis. Such pro- 
grams tend to legitimate the back-lash by providing it with 
much of the philosophical and moral base from which the civil 
rights movement itself began. And, indeed, there is no reason 
to believe that if racial issues become more, rather than less, of 
a political issue, Neroes will be the winners.156 
Professor Graglia has pointed out yet another disservice a 
university may do to minorities by holding out the promise of a 
quality product a t  a discounted price: "Inadequate grade school, 
high school, and college educational opportunities cannot be re- 
dressed by offering quality law school education. In quality edu- 
cation it is not possible to begin a t  the top."15' The flaw in the 
program that Graglia focuses on is merely one manifestation of 
something far more pervasive and more counterproductive: the 
insistence that problems be solved on the level of the symptoms 
rather than at the roots. Rather than preparing minority students 
to really compete in the admissions program, admission stand- 
ards are changed; rather than helping minority students to learn 
the law more thoroughly, the grading system is changed. It has 
even been suggested that rather than helping minorities pass the 
bar exam, the test should be changed.15s In short, concentration 
is placed not on making minority students professionals in the 
fullest sense of that word, but on making them professionals, if 
only in name. 
B. &ofessional Services Among Minority Groups 
One of the more serious medical problems facing the country 
is the inadequacy of medical services in poor minority neighbor- 
hoods. Data indicating a high incidence of many serious diseases 
among blacks1" may reflect a significant lack of available medical 
care. This scarcity of medical care is arguably caused by the 
shortage of practicing minority doctors. For example, the physi- 
156. Winter, supra note 109, at 854. See also Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 571. 
157. Graglia, supra note 109, at 353. 
158. See, e.g., Antonides, Minorities and the Bar Exam: Color Them Angry, JURIS 
Docro~, Aug./Sept. 1978, at 56. 
159. Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978). 
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cianlnonphysician ratio in the population generally is about 
seven times greater than the same ratio among blacks. The situa- 
tion for Chicanos and American Indians-for whom similar data 
are unavailable-is thought to be even worse.lN 
In Bakke the University of California did not argue that only 
blacks can treat blacks, but simply that they are more likely to 
do so: 
To suggest that the paucity of minority physicians is re- 
flected in poor medical care for minorities is not to suggest that 
only blacks can treat blacks or that only Asians should treat 
Asians . . . . It is simply to recognize the reality that many 
forces, including economics, idealism, and continuing patterns 
of discrimination, commonly bring minority physicians back 
into minority communities, where the shortage of health serv- 
ices is most severe, and that as a society we have refrained from 
compelling other physicians to locate their practices in those 
areas. 
"If you could insist, for instance, that the people 
who come into the professional school make a contract 
for 10 to 20 year terms to serve low-income people, then 
you would have no need to be racially selective. But the 
fact of the matter is you could neither make nor enforce 
such a contract ."161 
Although the University asserted that "many forces . . . com- 
monly bring minority physicians back into minority communi- 
ties,"162 the only evidence cited in its brief in support of that 
contention is the following statement: "There are data showing 
that doctors of non-racial ethnic groups (Anglo-Saxon, Irish, Ital- 
ian, Jewish, and Polish) tend to 'specialize in serving their fellow- 
ethnics.' 'w3 And although all the minority students participating 
in a preferential program may express an interest in practicing in 
disadvantaged ethnic communities, there are no guarantees that 
the students will ultimately practice in such communi t i e~ .~~  If 
the concern is truly with the medical services available to those 
who need it most-there seems to be no necessity for defining 
need in terms of race-those services can be virtually assured 
without reference to race, without constitutional infringement, 
160. Id. at 23. 
161. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Jenkins, The Howard Professional School in a New Social 
Perspective, 62 J. NAT'L MED. A. 167 (1970)). 
162. Id. at 25. 
163. Id. at 25 & n.24. 
164. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34,56,553 P.2d 1152,1167, 
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 695. (1976). 
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and without compelling anyone to do anything. The state could 
specify certain schools, or certain seats at certain schools, as 
available only to students who agree to "be bound-even as stu- 
dents a t  West Point are bound to spend time in the army-to 
spend time in the ghettos."165 
Likewise, rather than merely hoping that minority doctors 
will answer the needs of underserviced communities-and this 
a t  the price of curtailing a recognized constitutional right- 
increased medical services in such communities could be en- 
sured by having the states contract with medical students to 
practice in underserviced communities in exchange for free medi- 
cal education. The University of California insisted that "you 
could neither make nor enforce such contracts."1B6 While it might 
be impossible to compel the graduate's performance, the state 
could a t  least make breach sufficiently unattractive by demand- 
ing damages and preventing the breaching graduate from practic- 
ing elsewhere. la7 
Delivery of legal services presents a similar problem: "All 
should recognize that the current shortage of Negro attorneys has 
reached crisis proportions. Whatever one's view of ultimate objec- 
tives, it is clear that for the present more Negro attorneys must 
be trained as quickly as quality preparation permits."lB8 In addi- 
tion, there has been a heavier emphasis in the area of the law to 
insist on the need for lawyers from ethnic minorities to serve 
members of their respective ethnic groups. Sandalow states: 
Although it would be absurd to suppose that only a Jewish 
lawyer can adequately represent a Jew or that only a black 
lawyer can adequately represent a black, it is true nonetheless 
that many Jews and many blacks (like many persons of other 
- - -  
165. ~ u c k l e ~ F u ~ r a  note 115, 2 905. 
166. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 56, 553 P.2d 1152, 1167, 
132 Cai. Rptr. 680, 695 (1976). 
167. Regarding such personal services contracts, 
[i]t has been held that where an executory contract contains both positive and 
negative promises, and the Court is unable to enforce the former, it may never- 
theless enforce the latter by injunction. Thus, where a professional singer was 
sued by the proprietor of a theater for specific performance of a contract to sing 
a t  his theater upon certain terms, and during a certain period to sing nowhere 
else, the court refused to enforce so much of the contract as related to the 
promise to sing, but enforced the promise not to sing ekewhere by grmting an 
injunction. 
SIMPSON, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 406 (2d ed. 1965). 
168. Gelhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1075. See also 
O'Neil, supra note 137, at 329; Willey, supra note 28, at 222-23. 
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ethnic and racial backgrounds) would prefer to be represented 
by lawyers with an ethnic and racial identity similar to their 
own. The satisfaction of these wants, absent strong countervail- 
ing reasons, ought to be a permissible goal of public policy.16v 
Every individual should of course have the right, in selecting an 
attorney or a physician, to favor those who are members of his 
racial or ethnic group. But that fact does not imply that the state 
has a compelling interest in ensuring that lawyers and doctors of 
all racial and ethnic backgrounds are available. While the state 
has an obligation to protect the health and welfare of its resi- 
dents, it has no obligation to select a particular means to that end 
when other comparable means exist. This is especially true if 
selecting that particular means would require the suspension of 
a right vouchsafed by the Constitution. 
C. Racial Proportionality 
Integration is, of course, a valid social goal. But some would 
go even further, arguing that the state has a compelling interest 
in achieving racial proportionality. Such arguments are usually 
advanced with broad statements. "The integration of blacks and 
other disadvantaged minorities into the larger economic, political 
and social framework of the society continues to be an essential 
social goal."170 "Minorities [have been] grossly underrepresented 
in the medical profession."171 "The importance of a fundamental 
reordering of race relations in our society can scarcely be de- 
bated."172 "The time for racial balance is now."173 "The hope . . . 
is to set in motion a chain reaction leading to the break-down of 
a complex of conditions which today condemn large numbers of 
people to lives of poverty and desperation. " " [TI he mere elim- 
ination of formal barriers"175 is not enough; nothing short of "an 
integrated society in which persons of all races are represented in 
all walks of life and at all income levels"176 is enough. 
169. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 687 (footnote omitted). 
170. Id. at 688. 
171. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 85, 553 P.2d 1152, 1187, 
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 715 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
172. Karst and Horowitz, supra note 131, at 965. 
173. Cohen, supra note 109, at 138. 
174. Sandalow, supra note 17, at 689. 
175. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978). 
176. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 87, 553 P.2d 1152, 1188, 
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 716 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
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Naturally, the assimilation of minorities into "all walks of 
life" must include their entrance into the legal and medical pro- 
fessions. As demonstrated by the very existence of preferential 
admissions programs, however, the use of traditional "objective" 
admissions criteria "has disproportionately excluded minority 
groups from higher education,"177 and would likely continue to do 
In addition, "many who have been thus denied access were 
in fact qualified and would have done satisfactory academic 
work."17@ The demand, therefore, is not to admit unqualified mi- 
norities, but to admit qualified minorities, who by traditional 
standards are less qualified than their white competitors1" and 
consequently cannot become the doctors and lawyers needed to 
accomplish the goal of eradicating racial imbalance.lg1 Not to do 
so would "mark a return to virtually all-white professional 
schools," allowing the professions to remain "white enclaves."'" 
The Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of EducationlM conceded that school authorities might "as 
an educational policy" conclude that "in order to prepare stu- 
dents to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a 
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students."lS4 But the Court also 
noted that the district court could not "require, as a matter of 
substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial 
balance or mixing."lss The Court has there and elsewherelg6 been 
unwilling to require strict proportionality of state schools. Fur- 
thermore, the school desegration cases can be distinguished on 
the ground that they "deprive no one of a legally cognizable right 
or benefit."1B7 Congress has shown a similar reluctance. Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reads, in part: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to 
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any 
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, 
177. O'Neil, supra note 14, at 945. 
178. Margolis, supra note 10, at 420 & nn. 11 & 12. See Brief for Petitioner at 28-30; 
Broderick, supra note 31, at 170-71, 180-87. 
179. O'Neil, supra note 14, at 945. 
180. See Brief for Petitioner a t  6. 
181. 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). 
182. Brief for Petitioner at 13. 
183. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
184. Id. a t  16. 
185. Id. a t  24. 
186. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court noted that "desegregation, 
in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial 
balance in each 'school, grade, or classroom.' " Id. at 740-41. 
187. Lavinsky, supra note 109, a t  884 (footnote omitted). 
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sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of 
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number 
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or na- 
tional origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison with 
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, state, section, 
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, 
state, section, or other area.lss 
Although in Bakke the University of .California asserted in 
defense of their preferential admissions program that "[tlhe 
ends of the program are universally recognized as compelling,"la 
it adduced no evidence to that effect. What evidence there is 
indicates, at best, widespread disagreement over the means cho- 
sen by the University to advance its ends, and, at worst, funda- 
mental disagreement as to the ends themselves.lM Certainly one 
would expect a greater consensus if an interest was truly compel- 
ling. 
Professor Cohen opines that "the call for proportionality is 
inspired by a strange vision of an ideal society-one that is per- 
vaded by ethnic identification. According to that ideal the nu- 
merical proportionality of races is a principal measure of distribu- 
tive justice in virtually every sphere of social life."lgl His is no idle 
observation; the call may be heard even in Bakke. The following 
passage from Brennan's Bakke opinion is freighted with meaning: 
"States also may adopt race-conscious*programs designed to 
overcome substantial, chronic minority underrepresentation 
where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a prod- 
uct of past racial di~crimination."~~~ In other words, discrimina- 
tory (race-conscious) programs are valid so long as "the evil ad- 
dressed" is the result of racial discrimination; but the important 
point is that the term "the evil" is used not to describe racial 
discrimination, but "minority underrepresentation. " According 
to this reasoning, minority underrepresentation is considered evil 
per se (although not always redressable by the government) 
whether or not it is cawed by racial discrimination. Implicit in 
Brennan's statement is the premise that it is not racial discrimi- 
nation per se that is objectionable, but the fact that the nation's 
188. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 $703 Cj), 42 U.S.C. 5 200012-2 Cj) (1976). 
189. Brief for Petitioner at 32. 
190. See notes 109-11, 115 and accompanying text supra. 
191. Cohen, supra note 109, at 142. 
192. 438 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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social structure fails to conform to a particular idea of the model 
state. 
Here again, the question of a national consensus is relevant. 
Why should a state be allowed to marshal1 its educational re- 
sources for the purpose of imposing this vision of a racial utopia 
on its constituents, many of whom do not share in it? Indeed, as 
Justice Douglas insisted in his DeFunis dissent, this concept runs 
counter to the very concept of equal protection: 
The State, however, may not proceed by racial classification to 
force strict population equivalencies for every group in every 
occupation, overriding individual preferences. The Equal Pro- 
tection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not 
their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society 
ought to be organized.le3 
It is now clear that undergirding much of the rhetoric supporting 
preferential admissions-and affirmative action programs in gen- 
eral-is a view of justice that demands not that the state treat 
its citizens without reference to their race, but that it rearrange 
them precisely on the basis of their race. The objective is not 
equal treatment but equal representation. Consequently, the goal 
is not really equal opportunity; unless, of course, merely giving 
people equal opportunities will cause them to voluntarily line up 
in some predetermined order, which is possible but not likely. If 
by chance, given equal opportunity, Americans were to rearrange 
themselves along neatly racial lines, would preferential programs 
no longer be needed? Or would they still be necessary to maintain 
that delicate equilibrium? 
Some would counter that but for pervasive discrimination in 
the past American society would in fact be racially proportionate, 
or close to it. Brennan's Bakke opinion does not go that far; it 
merely contends that those who do go that far have good reason 
to believe what they believe. For example, it states that "Davis 
had a sound basis for believing" that undenepresentation was the 
result of racial discrimination, that "Davis had very good reason 
to believe" that a color-blind admission policy would not correct 
the pattern of minority underrepresentation, and that "Davis 
clearly could conclude" that minority underrepresentation is the 
result of historical discr iminat i~n.~~~ 
193. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
194. 438 U.S. at 369-71 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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There are at least two reasons for being skeptical of the prop- 
osition that previous discrimination is the sole cause of minority 
underrepresentation. The first is that the proposition cannot be, 
or at least has not been, proven.lS5 Brennan implicitly acknowl- 
edged this fad  (although he relied on the proposition anyway), 
as demonstrated by the language quoted above. No one can doubt 
that pervasive discrimination has contributed to the gross under- 
representation of minorities in, for example, the medical profes- 
sion. On the other hand, the question of chronic minority under- 
representation is so fraught with variables that to conclude 
blindly that the underrepresentation is "the result"lM of purpose- 
ful discrimination indicates an insensitivity to the complexities 
of a difficult problem. To do so is to presuppose that in a multi- 
racial society devoid of discrimination all races would be propor- 
tionately represented on all levels of society. A sweeping constitu- 
tional interpretation should not rest upon such an unsure founda- 
tion. An individual whose constitutional right is being suspended 
deserves at least to be presented with evidence of the allegedly 
compelling interest; the Court should not presume it. 
The second reason for caution in this area is that even if one 
were to attempt to prove the proposition that minority under- 
representation is caused by past discrimination, he could not base 
his argument on the premise that discrimination always causes 
underachievement. Indeed, it is plausible that discrimination 
may in fact boost achievement. It would not be illogical to argue, 
for example, that the spectacular intellectual record of the Jewish 
people has been enhanced rather than impaired by what is cer- 
tainly the longest if not the most brutal history of discrimination 
in the world. On the other hand, if one insisted that the effects 
of discrimination are always deleterious, he would be forced to 
195. Glazer noted: 
Absent discrimination, of course, one would expect nothing [like random distri- 
bution of women and minorities in all jobs]. Economists, labor market analysts, 
and sociologists have devoted endless energy to trying to determine the various 
elements that contribute to the distribution of jobs of minority groups. Some of 
the relevant factors are: level of education, quality of education, type of educa- 
tion, location by region, by city, by part of the metropolitan area, character of 
labor market at time of entry into the region or city, and many others. These 
are factors one can in part quantify. Others-such as taste or, if you will, cul- 
ture-are much more difficult to quantify. Discrimination is equally difficult to 
quantify. To reduce all differences in labor force distribution (even for entry- 
level jobs) to discrimination is an incredible simplification. 
N. GLAZER, supra note 117, a t  63. 
196. 438 U.S. a t  370 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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conclude that but for past discrimination the overrepresentation 
of Jewish people in academia would be even more pronounced 
than it is today. Consider the further anomaly of the rather suspi- 
cious underrepresentation of Jewish people among the ranks of 
professional baseball players.ln Is this "evil" the result of too 
much discrimination or not enough? 
Clearly, the attempt to characterize minority underrepre- 
sentation as the result of a single cause-discrimination-is 
overly simplistic. Courts that adjudicate on the basis of that char- 
acterization, especially when constitutional rights hang in the 
balance, are on perilous ground. The Constitution does not re- 
quire our courts to manipulate the law in order to ensure propor- 
tionate representation of certain racial groups in all segments of 
American society. 
D. Student Body Diversity 
From the grand vision of society arranged along racially pro- 
portionate lines springs a smaller vision, a vision of the student 
bodies in state-supported professional schools arranged to reflect 
the racial makeup of society at large. According to this view, there 
is intrinsic value in a diverse student body. Medical schools, for 
example, exist primarily for the purpose of training physicians to 
serve the medical needs of a heterogeneous society. Justice Powell 
observed in Bakke that the presence of minority students may 
bring to a medical school "experiences, outlooks and ideas that 
enrich the training of its student body and better equip its gadu- 
ates to render with understanding their vital service to human- 
ity ?" 
Promoting a higher quality of education is certainly a legiti- 
mate state interest. The state has a responsibility to train compe- 
tent doctors for all segments of society, especially those segments 
that are presently medically underserviced. To ensure that every 
medical school student has classmates who represent minority 
racial groups seems a logical way to increase nonminority stu- 
197. Consider the following statement: 
Recently a spokesman for the Jewish Defense League commented with tongue 
in cheek: 
"Jews come from athletically deprived backgrounds. Irving is kept off 
the sandlot by too much homework and too many music lessions. He 
is now 25 and still can't play ball, but 'he has the desire to learn.' 
Therefore, the Jewish Defense League is demanding that New York 
City which has a 24 percent Jewish population, fill the city's ball 
teams with 24 percent Jews." 
G .  ROCHE, THE BALANCING Am: QUOTA HIRING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 27-28 (1974). 
198. 438 U.S. at 314 (footnote omitted). 
251 EQUAL PROTECTION AND BAKKE 71 
dents' rapport with minorities and to sensitize them to minority 
health problems. There are, however, more direct and less consti- 
tutionally burdensome methods for accomplishing these ends, 
such as courses geared to minority medical problems1n and spe- 
cial internship programs. The existence of less burdensome alter- 
natives creates doubt as to the acceptability of quota admissions 
programs." 
In Bakke, however, Justice Powell took the student body 
diversity argument one step further. He argued that academic 
freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment," and that 
"[tlhe freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes the selection of its student body."a1 Thus, he 
concluded, although a university does not have a first amend- 
ment right to establish rigid racial quotas, it may constitutionally 
consider the race of its applicants if it does so in order to enhance 
the educational atmosphere of its campus.202 By implication, the 
protection of this first amendment right is a compelling reason to 
override the applicant's fourteenth amendment right not to be 
discriminated against on account of race. State schools are al- 
lowed to prefer some applicants (and thereby penalize others) on 
the ground that their race is, of itself, a "plus." The following 
statement by Justice Powell is reminiscent of those of Terrance 
Sandalow quoted earlier: 
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his 
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race 
being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an 
applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is 
thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial 
educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional 
personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership 
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of 
overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the 
poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In short, an 
199. Such courses are apparently already offered at Davis. Preferential Racial Admis- 
sions, supra note 30, at 751. 
200. The Court has held: 
Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "precision," and 
must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives. And if there are other, 
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally 
protected activity, a state may not choose the way of greater interference. If it 
acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (citations omitted). 
201. 438 U.S. at 312. 
202. Id. at 314. 
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admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to 
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the partic- 
ular qualifications of each applicant . . . . 203 
Justice Powell also stated: 
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another 
candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background 
will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat 
simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong 
surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications, 
which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not 
outweigh those of the other applicant.204 
The implication here is very strong that race holds no special 
constitutional place, but rather that it may be considered as one 
of many nonobjective admissions criteria. This conclusion ap- 
pears to repudiate the bulk of the opinion, which seems to be 
squarely based on the view that race holds a special place in 
constitutional jurisprudence. Furthermore, Justice Powell took 
great pains to avoid saying that the excluded applicant was not 
excluded because of his race. What he did say is that the appli- 
cant was not "foreclosed from all consideration" because of his 
race. The difference, however, does not seem to go to the constitu- 
tional point. It is clear that giving a "plus" to a minority student 
is quite meaningless unless the plus will give that minority stu- 
dent some concrete benefit he would not have had without it. In 
competition for admissions, there is only one concrete benefit: 
admission. And it is logically impossible to deny the other side 
of the coin: for every minority student whose plus made the differ- 
ence for him between admission and rejection there will perforce 
be a nonminority student who was excluded because he lacked 
the plus; excluded, in other words, because of his race. In the face 
of that inescapable fact, the excluded applicant cannot rightly be 
expected to take consolation that, although his race prevented 
his admission, it did not prevent his consideration. The purpose 
of applying, after all, is not to be considered, but to be admitted. 
Justice Powell's defense of this racially discriminatory prac- 
tice is grounded on the first amendment: state universities have 
a constitutional right to decide, on academic grounds, whom they 
will admit. That assertion raises a t  least two separate questions. 
First of all, if such a right exists in favor of a state institution, 
203. Id. at 317. 
204. Id. at 318. 
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it has never before been recognized. The only opinion quoted in 
support of this rightzo5 is a concurring opinion by Justice Frank- 
furter in Sweezy v. New H a m p ~ h i r e . ~ ~  The dispute in that case 
centered around whether an employee of a state university could 
be penalized for refusing to answer the state attorney general's 
questions pertaining to the employee's connection with an alleg- 
edly subversive organization. The subject of admissions was 
never broached. Furthermore, the rationale and holding of the 
case are based on the constitutional rights of individuals, not 
 institution^.^^ 
Secondly, Justice Powell seems to be suggesting that a gov- 
ernmental body may be possessed of a constitutional right. Con- 
sider the following passage from Bakke: "Thus, in arguing that 
its universities must be accorded the right to select those students 
who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,' 
petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of 
the First Amendment."z08 There is enough vagueness in the lan- 
guage to leave room for doubt, but it appears that Justice Powell 
is recognizing in a state university the capacity to invoke the first 
amendment in its own behalf. The suggestion is unprecedented. 
It is unnecessary here to review the theory of constitutional rights 
any more than to observe that their function has always been to 
protect the individual against the power of the government, 
rather than, as Justice Powell seems to suggest, protecting the 
government against the power of the individual. 
It has long been recognized that individuals employed by 
governmental agencies, such as state universities, are possessed 
of constitutional rights. In fact, the two cases Justice Powell cited 
on this subject held precisely that. In Sweezy, for example, the 
Court wrote: "Equally manifest as a fundamental principle of a 
democratic society is political freedom of the individual. Our 
form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall 
have the right to engage in political expression and associa- 
t i ~ n . " ~ @  Likewise, Keyishian v. Board of Regentsz1@ dealt with the 
first amendment rights of individual teachers. The Court stated 
that " '[olur nation is deeply committed to safeguarding aca- 
demic freedom which is of transcendent value to all of us and not 
205. Id. at 312. 
206. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
207. See id. 
208. 438 U.S. at 313. 
209. 354 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added). 
210. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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merely to the teachers concerned.' "211 The academic freedom re- 
ferred to was not the right of the state university as an institution, 
or the faculty as a body, but the climate of freedom which follows 
inexorably from allowing each individual teacher his or her full 
scope of expression; it is the sum total of many individuals exer- 
cising their individual freedom. The "robust exchange of ideas" 
commended by Justice Powel1212 results naturally in an environ- 
ment free from governmentally imposed restraints on basic free- 
doms. Once the government assumes the responsibility of ensur- 
ing that the exchange of ideas is sufficiently robust, it is in danger 
of stifling the very exchange it seeks to promote. Nothing is as 
certain to destroy the free marketplace of ideas as governmental 
interference. 
IV. DIAGNOSING Bakke 
A. Equal Protection Derailed 
It is not surprising that the result reached by Justice Powell 
in Bakke was very different from that reached by Justices Bren- 
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun; he applied a different view 
of equal protection. In the main, Justice Powell adopted the sym- 
metrical view of equal protection. "The guarantee of equal pro- 
tection," he wrote, "cannot mean one thing when applied to one 
individual and something else when applied to a person of an- 
other color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it 
is not equal."213 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Black- 
mun, on the other hand, adopted the preferential view. "[A] 
state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the pur- 
pose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact 
its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe 
that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimina- 
ti~n."~l'  The two opinions thus proceeded independently of each 
other; they moved in the same direction, but on parallel courses 
as it were, sharing little or no common ground. That their desti- 
nations overlapped is curious. They did so primarily because 
Justice Powell surprisingly found a compelling state interest 
where neither party had-in the first amendment right of a 
governmental institution. This derailment of Powell's analysis 
211. 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, .385 U.S. at 603). 
212. Id. at 313. 
213. Id. at 289-90. 
214. Id. at 369 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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kept his opinion from reaching its otherwise obvious conclusion 
-a result that would have enhanced the stability and persua- 
siveness of Bakke and better protected the integrity of the equal 
protection clause itself. The ultimate derailment of the Powell 
opinion, and consequently of the equal protection clause, funda- 
mentally undermines Bakke. 
B. The Larger Question 
It is fitting that the requirements of the "compelling state 
interest" test are stringent; the lifeblood of a constitutional safe- 
guard is its inviolability. Carl Cohen has observed: 
A constitution, ideally, is not an expression of particular social 
needs; rather, it identifies very general common purposes and 
lays down principles according to which the many specific ends 
of the body politic may be decided upon and pursued. Its most 
critical provisions will be those which absolutely preclude cer- 
tain means. Thus to say that a protection afforded citizens is 
"constitutional" is a t  least to affirm that it will be respected, 
come what may. The specific constitutional provision that each 
citizen is entitled to equal protection of the laws is assurance 
that, no matter how vital the government alleges its interest to 
be, or how laudable the objective of those who would temporar- 
ily suspend that principle, it will stand.*15 
A constitutional right that is honored only when there is no press- 
ing reason to dishonor it is of minimal value, for in those cases 
there is very little to protect against. It is when public sentiment, 
the wisdom of the experts, social statistics, humanitarian impul- 
ses, and national goals all seem to militate against respecting a 
particular safeguard that the safeguard is to be most respected; 
unless it is respected then, it is no safeguard. A right existing only 
at the pleasure of some judicial tribunal, even the Supreme Court 
of the United States, and which may be revoked by that tribunal 
at will, is constitutional in name only. When the Court under- 
takes to remake constitutional rules to accommodate specific so- 
cial goals, or when it stops looking at  what a provision means, and 
begins to speculate on how it can be used, the integrity of the 
document has been compromised. 
Justice Douglas sensed this principle in his now famous 
DeFunis dissent: "If discrimination based on race is constitution- 
ally permissible when those who hold the reins can come up with 
215. Cohen, supra note 109, at 139-40. 
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"compelling" reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees 
acquire an accordianlike quality. "116 Justice Jackson recognized 
it when he penned the following passage in West Virginia Board 
of Education u. Barr~ette:~l' 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab- 
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's 
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights 
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of 
no elections.*18 
Justice Jackson went further in his Korematsu dissent to warn 
that once the practice of making exceptions is begun, "[tlhe 
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand 
of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an 
urgent need. "21B 
Bakke is, however, more complex than Korematsu. In 
Korematsu, the Court was called upon to draw a line: How impor- 
tant must a governmental interest be before it can be classed as 
"compelling"? On the other hand, the central question of Bakke 
was whether to sanction two separate lines, one for minority 
Americans and the other for nonminorities. The decision of where 
each line should be drawn is subordinate to the decision of 
whether or not to draw two lines.220 By insisting that the compel- 
ling interest be defined in racial terms, proponents of preferential 
admissions demand that a recognized constitutional right be sus- 
pended because it is exercised by the wrong person. The Bakke 
Court's answer to the central question was uncertain, but the 
question will not go away.121 It is too persistent, too terrible, to 
be dismissed with an ambiguous gesture. 
At any rate, the Court has now struck to the heart of the 
matter. Anglo-American jurisprudence has been, over the de- 
cades, over the centuries, agonizingly winding its way to the reali- 
216. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
217. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
218. Id. at 638. 
219. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackso~  L, dissenting). 
220. An analogous case in the free speech area would only incidentally involve decid- 
ing how inflammatory a political statement has to be before it is no longer protected by 
the first amendment; it would primarily involve deciding whether certain political group 
have the right to make remarks that are more inflammatory than those other political 
groups may make. 
221. Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 559. 
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zation of the ideal that Bracton, four hundred years ago, memo- 
rialized with the words, "The King is subject not to men, but to 
God and the law."222 Now it seems that, in one area of national 
life a t  least, rule by law has nearly become a reality. Bakke now 
forces the question: Is rule by law what the nation really wants? 
Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing debate over the wisdom, 
urgency, or legality of preferential admissions, the real question 
will remain whether this nation is truly dedicated to a govern- 
ment of law and not of men. Because this is the question, it is 
relatively insignificant that the class to be singled out for special 
treatment is underprivileged rather than privileged; in either 
case, the impartiality of law is violated.223 And the violation of the 
rule-of-law principle is not without its risks, as Friedrich A. 
Hayek has warned: "It is the Rule of Law, in the sense of the rule 
of formal law, the absence of legal privileges of particular people 
designated by authority, which safeguards that equality before 
the law which is the opposite of arbitrary government. "224 To the 
extent that the courts are willing to enforce laws selectively in 
order to achieve effects on particular people, they must forfeit 
their claim to impartiality.225 Furthermore, once the government 
has taken upon itself the duty of altering rules for this or that 
person, party, or group, it must decide which person, party, or 
group requires assistance. Such a course inevitably results in offi- 
cial capriciousne~s.~~~ The dilemma was aptly articulated by John 
Stuart Mill: "We should be glad to see just conduct enforced and 
injustices repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not, 
with reason, afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited 
an amount of power over  individual^."^^ 
It may be that preferential admissions programs stem "from 
a desire to 'do something,' even though all that is within our 
power to do . . . is unsuitable or even counterproductive as a 
means of meeting the problem. . . . What we can do is . . . 
admit the deprived to our . . . schools. It a t  least shows where 
our hearts are."228 It may be that those who defend programs such 
222. Quoted in T. P L U C K N ~ ,  A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 49 (5th ed. 
1956). 
223. "You shall not pervert justice, either by favouring the poor or by subservience 
to the great." Leviticus 19:15 (New English version). 
224. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 79 (1944). 
225. Id. at 76. 
226. Id. at 73-74. 
227. Mill, Utilitarianism, in H. BEDAU, JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 53 (1971). 
228. Graglia, supra note 109, at 353. 
78 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
as the one under fire in Bakke are pained by the plight of mem- 
bers of society who seem to have little or no access to advantages 
that other members take for granted. It may be that they are 
moved when they look upon their fellows struggling, but unable, 
to find their way into the mainstream of American life. It may 
well be that they tremble with impatience at  the uncharitable 
posture that many voices demand the state universities .take. 
Nevertheless, it is finally justice, not charity, that must be de- 
manded from the government. It is only to justice, not to charity, 
that favoritism is f ~ r b i d d e n ; ~ ~  it is only in justice that the unlova- 
ble or unpopular can find refuge when public sentiment is against 
them; and it is only justice-formal justice-that keeps govern- 
ment from being entirely arbitrary. 
The establishment of universal happiness cannot be rele- 
gated to those who have ultimate power over life and property. 
Indeed, even the definition of happiness cannot be relegated to 
them. The state can be trusted to establish fair, formal rules 
within which each citizen can define and pursue his own happi- 
ness. But when the state unconstitutionally refuses to stay its 
hand, even in the pursuit of some laudable objective; when it 
insists on overstepping the bounds of justice in the name of jus- 
tice; when it substitutes, for a system of impartial, generalized 
rules, a headlong rush towards some utopian vision, however glo- 
rious; then to that extent, individual life, liberty, and happiness 
must ultimately be abandoned. 
- 
229. See C. PERELMAN, supra note 107, at 41. 
